Abstract-The increasing performance and decreasing cost of processors and memory are causing system intelligence to move from the CPU to peripherals such as disk drives. Storage system designers are using this trend toward excessive computation capability to perform more complex processing and optimizations directly inside the storage devices. Such kind of optimizations have been performed only at low levels of the storage protocol. Another factor to consider is the current trends in storage density, mechanics, and electronics, which are eliminating the bottleneck encountered while moving data off the media, and putting pressure on interconnects and host processors to move data more efficiently. Previous work on active storage has taken advantage of the extra processing power on individual disk drives to run application-level code. This idea of moving portions of an application's processing to run directly at disk drives can dramatically reduce data traffic and take advantage of the parallel storage already present in large systems today. This paper aims at demonstrating active storage on an iSCSI OSD standards-based object oriented framework.

Abstract-Data-dependent access patterns of an application to an untrusted storage system are notorious for leaking sensitive information about the user's data. Previous research has shown how an adversary capable of monitoring both read and write requests issued to the memory can correlate them with the application to learn its sensitive data. However, information leakage through only the write access patterns is less obvious and not well studied in the current literature. In this work, we demonstrate an actual attack on power-side-channel resistant Montgomery's ladder based modular exponentiation algorithm commonly used in public key cryptography. We infer the complete 512-bit secret exponent in ∼ 3.5 minutes by virtue of just the write access patterns of the algorithm to the main memory. In order to learn the victim algorithm's write access patterns under realistic settings, we exploit a compromised DMA device to take frequent snapshots of the application's address space, and then run a simple differential analysis on these snapshots to find the write access sequence. The attack has been shown on an Intel Core(TM) i7-4790 3.60GHz processor based system. We further discuss a possible attack on McEliece public-key cryptosystem that also exploits the write-access patterns to learn the secret key.

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