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The concept of public service bargain (PSB) has been reintroduced in recent times to the study of public administration to analyse the division of roles between ministers and the civil service in the context of public service reforms (Hood 2000, 2001, 2002; Hood and Lodge 2006). The empirical investigation of the concept of PSB in general and changes in PSBs in particular is, however, limited. This article addresses this limitation by investigating what causes changes in public service bargains, particularly with respect to the provision of advice. As argued by Hood, we demonstrate how changes in PSBs can be explained by a combination of changes in the environments of ministries as well as the interests of the political actors. Furthermore, we point to the professional qualifications of civil servants as well as their interests as causes of change which, until now, have not received sufficient attention in the PSB literature. The article is based on a longitudinal case study of PSB between ministers and the permanent civil service in Denmark.

Even though structural causes of presidentialization such as the growth of the state, the development of a modern mass media, the erosion of cleavages, and the Europeanization of politics, all exist in the Danish case, the logic and reality of consensus politics means that domestic politics is still not heavily presidentialized. Presidential trends within parties are limited to a discernible strengthening of party leaders in respect of the resources available to them and their potential to influence the candidate-nomination process. In regard to the electoral process, some presidentialization is seen especially in relation to media coverage. Perceiving the way in which the media seek to personalize their coverage of politics, the parties have sought to accommodate this in their campaign strategies. The presidentialization process seems stronger in the governmental arena with a growing longevity of Prime Ministers in executive office, increasing frequency with which the premiers reshuffle their cabinets, the growing use of cabinet committees as means of executive coordination, the gradual growth of the Prime Minister’s Office, a new system by which media relations are coordinated by the Prime Minister’s staff, and the Prime Minister’s larger role in international affairs due to Europeanization. On the other hand, the Prime Minister does not enjoy any formal rights of patronage and, most significantly, prime ministerial power in Denmark is still kept in check by consensus politics. The tradition of minority and multiparty government makes this a necessity, and consensus culture does not generally call for strong personalized leadership.

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The Danish senior civil service has a mixture of older and newer traditions, in which history and tradition are very important. Accordingly, this chapter starts by summarizing the historical background to the Danish central public administration and the historical role of Danish civil servants. Further sections then introduce the common organizational principles governing the central public administration. The different sections discuss: ranks and numbers of senior civil servants at the top levels; methods of recruitment and promotion; inter‐ministerial mobility; pay; party membership and the senior civil service; the status in the civil service of high status ministries; the social and educational background of top officials; women at the top; interaction and formal contacts within and between ministries; and political party policies towards the senior civil service.