This article argues for the systematic incorporation of power and interests into analysis of the cross-border transfer of practices within multinational companies (MNCs). Using a broadly Lukesian perspective on power it is argued that the transfer of practices involves different kinds of power capabilities through which MNC actors influence their institutional environment both at the 'macro-level' of host institutions and the 'microlevel' of the MNC itself. The incorporation of an explicit account of the way power interacts with institutions at different levels, it is suggested, underpins a more convincing account of transfer than is provided by the dominant neoinstitutionalist perspective in international business, and leads to a heuristic model capable of generating proposed patterns of transfer outcomes that may be tested empirically in future research.

This article revisits a central question in the debates on the management of multinationals: the balance between centralized policy-making and subsidiary autonomy. It does so through data from a series of case studies on the management of human resources in American multinationals in the UK. Two strands of debate are confronted. The first is the literature on differences between multinationals of different national origins which has shown that US companies tend to be more centralized, standardized, and formalized in their management of human resources. It is argued that the literature has provided unconvincing explanations of this pattern, failing to link it to distinctive features of the American business system in which US multinationals are embedded. The second strand is the wider debate on the balance between centralization and decentralization in multinationals. It is argued that the literature neglects important features of this balance: the contingent oscillation between centralized and decentralized modes of operation and (relatedly) the way in which the balance is negotiated by organizational actors through micro-political processes whereby the external structural constraints on the company are defined and interpreted. In such negotiation, actors' leverage often derives from exploiting differences between the national business systems in which the multinational operates.Keywords: US multinational companies, human resource management, centralization, subsidiary autonomy, power This article uses case-study evidence on the management of employment relations in US multinational companies (MNCs) to consider a staple question of the literature on multinationals: the balance between centralized policymaking and subsidiary autonomy. It confronts two strands of debate. First, it addresses the body of research that has examined differences between MNCs of different national origins. US companies have been found to be more centralized, standardized, and formalized in their management of human resources and other employment-relations policies. While the findings of the present research are broadly in line with those of other studies, it tries to go beyond the existing literature to link observed patterns to distinctive features of the American business system in which these MNCs are 'embedded'.Second, it explores the implications of its findings for some of the dominant themes of the familiar literature on the degree of central control over subsidiary operations. This is one of the key questions of multinational operation; it Organization Studies 25(3): 363-391

This article argues that the institutional "home" and "host" country effects on employment policy and practice in multinational corporations (MNCs) need to be analyzed within a framework which takes more account both of the multiple levels of embeddedness experienced by the MNC, and processes of negotiation at different levels within the firm. Using in-depth case study analysis of the human resource (HR) structure and industrial relations and pay policies of a large U.S.-owned MNC in the IT sector, across Germany, Ireland, Spain, and the United Kingdom, the article attempts to move towards such a framework.

This article uses a large-scale representative survey to examine a key aspect of control in multinational companies (MNCs): the extent of central influence over human resource (HR) policy formation in subsidiaries. This is a crucial aspect of behaviour, relevant for example for the cross-border diffusion of policies and practices and for the institutional distinctiveness of practice within a given host environment. The article assesses how far policy is determined by corporate headquarters or some other higher-level organizational structure. Its novelty lies primarily in its exploration of the influence of the structure of the HR management (HRM) function on subsidiary discretion. It finds, first, that the degree of central control is influenced for different HR issues by nationality of ownership and by international product/service standardization. Second, there is some variability in the antecedents associated with discretion on different HR issues. Finally, aspects of the structure of the HRM function significantly affect discretion, notably the networking of HR managers across borders and the direct reporting relationships within the function between the UK and higher organizational levels.

In the introductory article to a special issue on multinational corporations (MNCs) and employment practices, the authors highlight the key features of an international survey research project. Research teams carried out parallel surveys in four countries: Canada, Ireland, Spain, and the United Kingdom. These surveys are the most comprehensive investigations of the employment practices in MNCs in their respective countries. In framing the comparative analysis of these data, the teams had four objectives: (1) to explore the processes of integration and differentiation in MNCs, including the interactions among MNCs and nation states and their impact on employment practices; (2) to chart the influence of foreign direct investment (FDI) and systems of industrial relations; (3) to outline the key elements of the research design and chart the process of collecting data; and (4) to provide a summary of the patterns of integration and differentiation found among MNCs.