Published in the AbstractThis paper uses a comparative institutionalist approach combined with a power/interests perspective to examine the processes whereby diversity policy is "internationalized" by US multinational companies. It argues that the process of policy transfer to UK subsidiaries is complicated by incomplete and contested "institutionalization" of diversity within the US itself, and by differing conceptions of diversity between the US and the UK. The ability of actors within the UK subsidiaries to mobilize and deploy specific power resources allows them to resist the full implementation of corporate diversity policy, leading to a range of compromise accommodations. It is argued that the findings have more general implications for analyzing the transfer of HR practices between national business systems.

This article revisits a central question in the debates on the management of multinationals: the balance between centralized policy-making and subsidiary autonomy. It does so through data from a series of case studies on the management of human resources in American multinationals in the UK. Two strands of debate are confronted. The first is the literature on differences between multinationals of different national origins which has shown that US companies tend to be more centralized, standardized, and formalized in their management of human resources. It is argued that the literature has provided unconvincing explanations of this pattern, failing to link it to distinctive features of the American business system in which US multinationals are embedded. The second strand is the wider debate on the balance between centralization and decentralization in multinationals. It is argued that the literature neglects important features of this balance: the contingent oscillation between centralized and decentralized modes of operation and (relatedly) the way in which the balance is negotiated by organizational actors through micro-political processes whereby the external structural constraints on the company are defined and interpreted. In such negotiation, actors' leverage often derives from exploiting differences between the national business systems in which the multinational operates.Keywords: US multinational companies, human resource management, centralization, subsidiary autonomy, power This article uses case-study evidence on the management of employment relations in US multinational companies (MNCs) to consider a staple question of the literature on multinationals: the balance between centralized policymaking and subsidiary autonomy. It confronts two strands of debate. First, it addresses the body of research that has examined differences between MNCs of different national origins. US companies have been found to be more centralized, standardized, and formalized in their management of human resources and other employment-relations policies. While the findings of the present research are broadly in line with those of other studies, it tries to go beyond the existing literature to link observed patterns to distinctive features of the American business system in which these MNCs are 'embedded'.Second, it explores the implications of its findings for some of the dominant themes of the familiar literature on the degree of central control over subsidiary operations. This is one of the key questions of multinational operation; it Organization Studies 25(3): 363-391

This article argues that the institutional "home" and "host" country effects on employment policy and practice in multinational corporations (MNCs) need to be analyzed within a framework which takes more account both of the multiple levels of embeddedness experienced by the MNC, and processes of negotiation at different levels within the firm. Using in-depth case study analysis of the human resource (HR) structure and industrial relations and pay policies of a large U.S.-owned MNC in the IT sector, across Germany, Ireland, Spain, and the United Kingdom, the article attempts to move towards such a framework.

This article examines the transfer of employment practices across borders within multinational companies. We contrast market‐based, cross‐national comparative and micro‐political perspectives on this issue and argue for an integrated approach that focuses on interrelationships between markets and institutions on the one hand and the material interests of actors on the other. We develop this argument using data from a multi‐level case study of a multinational in the US and Britain.

This article explores the implications of deregulation for gender equality. Comparative, outcomes-based analyses suggest that deregulated systems are characterized by inequality. A critical case study of British Gas is used here to evaluate the prospects for equality bargaining, that is the use of voluntary, joint regulation to further equality, in the wake of radical deregulation. Responsibility for equality in the workplace is found to have been privatized. The state as regulator has stood back and managers have reclaimed equality policy within managerial prerogative. Action on inequality has become conditional upon the existence of a business case, an approach that is insufficient for the task. Some re-regulation is required to help bargainers exploit fully the potential of joint regulation for equality.