In recent years, the concept of identity has become central to International Relations theory. Opposing rational actor assumptions, constructivist and post-structuralist identity scholarship has argued that preferences and interests are tied to actors' identities, which, in turn, explain action. While we welcome the attempt to move beyond rationalist and materialist accounts of state action, we argue that identity scholarship conceptualizes identity in methodologically individualist and causal terms. However, understanding identity in this way hinders us from grasping how actors are situated and continually develop within complex networks of social interdependencies. We suggest an approach that draws on processual-relational thinking and figurational sociology, and that shifts analysis from searching for identity to analysing identification processes. Contrary to the notion that identities inform action, we argue that specific sets of identifications are temporarily and incompletely stabilized in decision-making, and do not precede or inform action. To this end, we develop a model for empirical research that makes agency in identification processes visible and apply it to Swiss foreign policy decision-making. We suggest that non-foundationalist research revisit and discuss how identity is conceptualized and used in research, lest it reproduce the pitfalls of rationalist and materialist approaches.

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Nuclear weapons remain the unquestioned core of the defence postures of both France and the United Kingdom. At the same time, the European Union is progressively enhancing its Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), notably through the establishment of a European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP). Yet, despite evident progress in the CFSP, whose ultimate purpose is to lead to a ‘common defence policy’, EU member-states still deal with nuclear issues on a predominantly national basis. What is the alleged purpose of European nuclear forces? How is the raison d’être of the French and British nuclear deterrents conceptualized against the background of progressing European (defence) integration? This article examines the construction of the rationale of the French and British nuclear forces and their compatibility with the emerging European defence policy, particularly with regard to a hypothetical integration of both arsenals into a common deterrent. Could and should a ‘European nuclear deterrent’ be envisaged as the final stage in the framing of a European defence?