The article discusses the conditions under which the Russian “turn to the East” is implemented. It emphasizes that the basis for the “turn” is the Russian-Chinese relations. However, there is a number of intense changes in the foreign policy of China itself as long as it becomes a primary tool for supporting economic growth. The main characteristics of the emerging concept of China's foreign policy are: raise of military power of China, “investment attack” on emerging markets, consolidation of regional “zones of new influence of China”, development of the “new type” relations with the US. These features make the behavior of China in defense of their own interests more aggressive (including relations with Russia). Therefore, Russian innovation in the field of geo-economic strategy must be adapted to the new elements of Chinese foreign policy. Despite the status of a “strategic partnership” a number of problems have developed between China and Russia in recent years. These include, mainly, lack of trust because of the unwillingness to provide to each other full political and military-political support and non-optimal consideration of the United States factor in relations between Russia and China. This presupposes the partial “strategic partnership” only. However, the “new interest” of China in Russia is becoming more urgent since China uses Russian "turn to the East" for its own strategic purposes. It is impossible not to see that China refused to support Western sanctions not due to political solidarity with Russia but due to the Chinese business interests’ protection. China is developing plans of entering into those sectors and niches of the Russian economy, which are released as a result of leaving or “non-arrival” of the Western capital. The “turn to the East” strategy (which means the “turn to China”) can soften the internal losses of Russia from the “war of sanctions” with the West, but will not replace the Russian-American cooperation in the sphere of strategic stability, nuclear nonproliferation, space, terrorism, and climate change.

The article addresses the experience of Fumio Kishida’s first year as Prime Minister of the Japanese government with respect to its economic policy vision and implementation. The latter is presented by comparing it to the policy pursued over the past ten years by PM Kishida’s predecessors in the office, on the one hand, and to the commitments he announced during the 2021 election campaign, on the other. The paper notes that, in its basic moments, the economic policy of the cabinet of the new leader of the ruling Liberal Democratic Party continues the course previously maintained by the team of then-PM Shinzō Abe, known as Abenomics. This manifests itself in the specifics of the use of basic tools of macroeconomic policy, monetary and tax instruments to be named first, as well as in choosing priorities for the policy stimulating consumption and economic activity. The continuity of the course can be particularly illustrated by loose monetary policy; positive view of the depreciation of Japanese national currency; moderately expansionary fiscal policy relying on domestic borrowing; preference given to the interests of the corporate sector. Legacy inherited from previous administrations also includes the government striving to revitalize private demand; promoting investment in R&D, venture and innovating enterprises with particular stress on regional economies. Kishida’s particular emphasis on invigorating redistributive mechanisms and increasing labor share in national income has not yet led to material decisions and actions by the government. Nor did Kishida make progress with his commitment to expand the ring of beneficiaries of the capitalist market system, as part of his idea of “new capitalism”.In recent months, the attention of the government and its economic team has been largely focused on overcoming the consequences of the disruption of transnational chain lines in production, trade, and logistics, as a result of the coronavirus pandemic and rising geopolitical tensions. In addressing this issue, they prioritized subsidizing businesses and households to partially offset energy and food price hikes; securing diversification or localization of critical links of trade and production chains, as well as the exclusion of politically undesirable or unstable locations from them. At this stage, however, the actions of the government are limited to setting relevant goals and plans to provide finance for programs with effectiveness yet to be proved.

Доклад «Россия и мир: 2020» восемнадцатый в серии регулярных, ежегодных публикаций ИМЭМО РАН и Фонда Перспективных исследований и инициатив. Доклад состоит их двух частей, посвященных экономике (часть I) и внешней политике (часть II). Главное внимание сфокусировано на проблемах, имеющих ключевое значение для обеспечения стабильного экономического развития России на ближайшую (2020 г.) и более отдаленную перспективу. Приведен анализ и прогноз экономической ситуации в 2019-2020 гг. в мировой экономике, а также в экономиках России, Европы, США, Японии, Китая, Индии. Прогнозируется конъюнктура важнейших рынков российского экспорта. В подготовке доклада был использован многолетний опыт прогнозных исследований, проводимых Институтом мировой экономики и международных отношений РАН. Во второй части доклада представлен прогноз развития международных отношений в 2020 г. Анализируются основные внешние вызовы для России и возможности ответа на них.

Russia enters 2017 in a paradoxical situation. The Kremlin is open and ready for strategic negotiations on the entire spectrum of world issues. It is free from any internal political constraints that would impede upon its foreign policy and is thus in a position to act effectively. Yet Russia finds itself alone at the negotiating table. Russia's partners are busy with either elections (the US in November 2016, France and Germany in 2017) or critical institutional issues (the European Union) and are therefore not prepared to negotiate or, more importantly, to resolve strategic global issues. However, the three key issues-Syria, terrorism, and Ukrainewill determine the general agenda and, indeed, the very possibility of further negotiations between Russia and the West. The BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa) and the SCO (Shanghai Cooperation Organisation), which have provided alternative formats, and have been the backbone of Russia's political narrative in recent years, are faltering. The political crisis in Brazil and a general rightward political shift in Latin America stymie any talk of an intensified development of relations with the countries of the region as a pre-emptive counterweight to deteriorating relations with the West. In 2017, these trends will continue to develop. The lack of strategic goal-setting by Western partners hinders the shaping and implementation of the Kremlin's foreign policy, thereby forcing it to continue feeling its way, looking for instruments to maintain the fragile balance and dialogue. This has resulted in actions ranging from the heavy-handed (e.g. in early October President Putin signed a decree suspending the plutonium utilisation agreement with the 85

This forecast examines the major trends in Russia's relations with the world and in the Russian view of the world in 2016. The forecast looks firstly at Russia's role in the world in the context of the extant and emergent state of geopolitics. In a confused international environment, caught between the multiple, discordant and disorderly games of checkers of the present and the emerging design of a new grand chessboard for international relations, Russia and the West have been forced into cooperation. While far from easy and far from guaranteed to work – or last – this situation does offer the possibility of overcoming divides to pursue mutual interests. These interests become particularly apparent in the context of increased shared threats and the need to act jointly against them, the uncertainties created by rising powers, and the difficulties that Russia finds itself in. The key role of new mega-regional trade agreements in this emerging great game is also emphasised in the subsequent sections of the forecast, which deal, respectively, with foreign policy and political economy. The foreign policy analysis sees the US in flux in a presidential election year, and the EU caught at the crossroads of its own failure to capitalise on integration and a migration crisis of unprecedented proportions. Meanwhile, foreign policy in the post-Soviet space is characterised more by stasis than by substantial change, with frozen conflicts and stagnant reforms in Ukraine and limited room for manoeuvre for other players the order of the day. The Russian involvement in the Middle East, however, is anything but stagnant, with the military operations in Syria having dramatic effects in both the situation in Syria and global and regional geopolitics. The sustainability of this quest for influence, however, is questioned by the attitude of other players, but also by Russia's own internal weaknesses, notably its serious and deepening economic crisis.