<p class="MsoBlockText" style="margin: 0in 32.6pt 0pt 0.5in;"><span style="font-size: 10pt; mso-bidi-font-family: 'Times New Roman'; mso-no-proof: no;"><span style="font-family: Times New Roman;">In this paper, we analyze the value of services rendered by tax practitioners,<span dir="rtl"> </span>demonstrating that the conventional single-period solution may be inconsistent with their role. We contend that the value of these services stems from tax practitioners' knowledge of the tax code and not from the signal they convey to tax authorities when they sign the returns. We take the position that taxpayers' actions may not convey a signal to the tax enforcement agent, thereby enabling the latter to set different detection rates for different taxpayers. If taxpayers' actions were to convey a signal, the solution would not be sustainable, since it would eventually lead to a self-revealing &ldquo;corner solution,&rdquo; in which all taxpayers would take the same action. </span></span></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify; margin: 0in 32.6pt 0pt 0.5in; unicode-bidi: embed; direction: ltr;"><span style="mso-bidi-font-family: 'Times New Roman'; mso-no-proof: no;"><span style="font-family: Times New Roman; font-size: x-small;">&nbsp;</span></span></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify; margin: 0in 32.6pt 0pt 0.5in; unicode-bidi: embed; direction: ltr;"><span style="mso-bidi-font-family: 'Times New Roman'; mso-no-proof: no;"><span style="font-size: x-small;"><span style="font-family: Times New Roman;">In a single-period framework, the taxpayer&rsquo;s decision to hire a practitioner is dependent upon two variables: the practitioners&rsquo; fee, which is known to the tax enforcement agent, and taxpayers' risk attitude. The tax enforcement agent can infer the latter if the taxpayers use practitioners who sign the tax returns.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">&nbsp; </span>If taxpayers use practitioners&rsquo; services, we are able to derive the same exact solution irrespective of whether or not practitioners<strong> </strong>sign the returns.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">&nbsp; </span>Thus, we suspect that the value of these services does not stem from the fact that the returns are signed. </span></span></span></p>

This paper presents a detailed analysis of the principal socioeconomic characteristics of the population of the Bronx at the end of 2009, and compares them with the socioeconomic characteristics of the populations of the State of New York and the (rest of the) United States. The paper is divided into four (4) sections: (1) demographic characteristics, (2) social characteristics, (3) housing characteristics, and (4) economic characteristics.

This paper takes its motives from recent literature concerning the debate on the Keynesian proposition and the Ricardian equivalence, using data of the Greek economy and applying cointegration analysis, Granger causality tests and impulse response functions (IRF). The aim of the econometric methodology is to derive robust results by means of using alternative quantitative techniques. The empirical analysis shows the existence of dynamic relationships between the budget deficit and the interest rate, indicating a two-way causality between deficits and interest rates. The findings of Granger tests and IRFs contradict the view of Ricardian equivalence that government deficits do not influence the behavior of interest rate. Experimenting with the four-variable system (R, D, Y, P), IRF results show that in the case of Greece the budget deficit positively affects the inflation rate. The evidence that budget deficits exert positive effects on interest rates and inflation is consistent with the rationale of the Keynesian proposition.

No abstract