Most normative systems make use of explicit representations of norms (namely, obligations, prohibitions, and permissions) and associated mechanisms to support the self-regulation of open societies of self-interested and autonomous agents. A key problem in research on normative systems is that of how to synthesise effective and efficient norms. Manually designing norms is time consuming and error prone. An alternative is to automatically synthesise norms. However, norm synthesis is a computationally complex problem. We present a novel online norm synthesis mechanism, designed to synthesise compact normative systems. It yields normative systems composed of concise (simple) norms that effectively coordinate a multiagent system (MAS) without lapsing into overregulation. Our mechanism is based on a central authority that monitors a MAS, searching for undesired states. After detecting undesirable states, the central authority then synthesises norms aimed to avoid them in the future. We demonstrate the effectiveness of our approach through experimental results.

Norm-governed virtual organizations define, govern and facilitate coordinated resource sharing and problem solving in societies of agents. With an explicit account of norms, openness in virtual organizations can be achieved: new components, designed by various parties, can be seamlessly accommodated. We focus on virtual organizations realised as multi-agent systems, in which human and software agents interact to achieve individual and global goals. However, any realistic account of norms should address their dynamic nature: norms will change as agents interact with each other and their environment. Due to the changing nature of norms or due to norms stemming from different virtual organizations, there will be situations when an action is simultaneously permitted and prohibited, that is, a conflict arises. Likewise, there will be situations when an action is both obliged and prohibited, that is, an inconsistency arises. We introduce an approach, based on first-order unification, to detect and resolve such conflicts and inconsistencies. In our proposed solution, we annotate a norm with the set of values their variables should not have in order to avoid a conflict or an inconsistency with another norm. Our approach neatly accommodates the domain-dependent interrelations among actions and the indirect conflicts/inconsistencies these may cause. More generally, we can capture a useful notion of inter-agent (and inter-role) delegation of actions and norms associated to them, and use it to address conflicts/inconsistencies caused by action delegation. We illustrate our approach with an e-Science example in which agents support Grid services.

Norms (permissions, obligations and prohibitions) offer a useful and powerful abstraction with which to capture social constraints in multi-agent systems. Norms should exclude disruptive or antisocial behaviour without prescribing the design of individual agents or restricting their autonomy. An important challenge, however, in the design and management of systems governed by norms is that norms may, at times, conflict with one another; e.g, an action may be simultaneously prohibited and obliged for a particular agent. In such circumstances, agents no longer have the option of complying with these norms; whatever they do or refrain from doing will lead to a social constraint being broken. In this paper, we present mechanisms for the detection and resolution of normative conflicts. These mechanisms, based on first-order unification and constraint solving techniques, are the building blocks of more sophisticated algorithms we present for the management of normative positions, that is, the adoption and removal of permissions, obligations and prohibitions in societies of agents. We capture both direct and indirect conflicts between norms, formalise a practical concept of authority, and model conflicts that may arise as a result of delegation. We are able to formally define classic ways for resolving conflicts such as lex superior and lex posterior.

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Abstract. Norms constitute a powerful coordination mechanism among heterogeneous agents. In this paper, we propose means to specify and explicitly manage the normative positions of agents (permissions, prohibitions and obligations), with which distinct deontic notions and their relationships can be captured. Our rule-based formalism includes constraints for more expressiveness and precision and allows the norm-oriented programming of electronic institutions: normative aspects are given a precise computational interpretation. Our formalism has been conceived as a machine language to which other higher-level normative languages can be mapped, allowing their execution, as we illustrate with a selection of examples from the literature.