Human infants face the formidable challenge of learning the structure of their social environment. Previous research indicates that infants have early-developing representations of intentional agents, and of cooperative social interactions, that help meet that challenge. Here we report five studies with 144 infant participants showing that 10-to 13-month-old, but not 8-month-old, infants recognize when two novel agents have conflicting goals, and that they use the agents’ relative size to predict the outcome of the very first dominance contests between them. These results suggest that preverbal infants mentally represent social dominance and use a cue that covaries with it phylogenetically, and marks it metaphorically across human cultures and languages, to predict which of two agents is likely to prevail in a conflict of goals.

How does repeated or chronic childhood adversity shape social and cognitive abilities? According to the prevailing deficit model, children from high-stress backgrounds are at risk for impairments in learning and behavior, and the intervention goal is to prevent, reduce, or repair the damage. Missing from this deficit approach is an attempt to leverage the unique strengths and abilities that develop in response to high-stress environments. Evolutionary-developmental models emphasize the coherent, functional changes that occur in response to stress over the life course. Research in birds, rodents, and humans suggests that developmental exposures to stress can improve forms of attention, perception, learning, memory, and problem solving that are ecologically relevant in harsh-unpredictable environments (as per the specialization hypothesis). Many of these skills and abilities, moreover, are primarily manifest in currently stressful contexts where they would provide the greatest fitness-relevant advantages (as per the sensitization hypothesis). This perspective supports an alternative adaptation-based approach to resilience that converges on a central question: "What are the attention, learning, memory, problem-solving, and decision-making strategies that are enhanced through exposures to childhood adversity?" At an applied level, this approach focuses on how we can work with, rather than against, these strengths to promote success in education, employment, and civic life.

The direction of an association at the population-level may be reversed within the subgroups comprising that population—a striking observation called Simpson's paradox. When facing this pattern, psychologists often view it as anomalous. Here, we argue that Simpson's paradox is more common than conventionally thought, and typically results in incorrect interpretations—potentially with harmful consequences. We support this claim by reviewing results from cognitive neuroscience, behavior genetics, clinical psychology, personality psychology, educational psychology, intelligence research, and simulation studies. We show that Simpson's paradox is most likely to occur when inferences are drawn across different levels of explanation (e.g., from populations to subgroups, or subgroups to individuals). We propose a set of statistical markers indicative of the paradox, and offer psychometric solutions for dealing with the paradox when encountered—including a toolbox in R for detecting Simpson's paradox. We show that explicit modeling of situations in which the paradox might occur not only prevents incorrect interpretations of data, but also results in a deeper understanding of what data tell us about the world.

Many studies in humans have shown that adverse experience in early life is associated with accelerated reproductive timing, and there is comparative evidence for similar effects in other animals. There are two different classes of adaptive explanation for associations between early-life adversity and accelerated reproduction, both based on the idea of predictive adaptive responses (PARs). According to external PAR hypotheses, early-life adversity provides a 'weather forecast' of the environmental conditions into which the individual will mature, and it is adaptive for the individual to develop an appropriate phenotype for this anticipated environment. In internal PAR hypotheses, early-life adversity has a lasting negative impact on the individual's somatic state, such that her health is likely to fail more rapidly as she gets older, and there is an advantage to adjusting her reproductive schedule accordingly. We use a model of fluctuating environments to derive evolveability conditions for acceleration of reproductive timing in response to early-life adversity in a long-lived organism. For acceleration to evolve via the external PAR process, early-life cues must have a high degree of validity and the level of annual autocorrelation in the individual's environment must be almost perfect. For acceleration to evolve via the internal PAR process requires that early-life experience must determine a significant fraction of the variance in survival prospects in adulthood. The two processes are not mutually exclusive, and mechanisms for calibrating reproductive timing on the basis of early experience could evolve through a combination of the predictive value of early-life adversity for the later environment and its negative impact on somatic state.

A predominant view in psychology is that early psychosocial adversity (e.g., abuse) impairs cognition, because children from stressful backgrounds (e.g., violent households) score lower on standard tests of intelligence, language, memory, inhibition, and other abilities. However, recent studies indicate that these people may exhibit improved detection, learning, and memory on tasks involving stimuli that are ecologically relevant to them (e.g., dangers), compared with safely nurtured peers. These findings contradict the view that cognition of stressed people is generally impaired; they suggest, rather, that these people’s minds are developmentally specialized toward local environmental conditions. Here, we review recent research supporting this hypothesis. In addition, we propose that novel studies should examine whether stressed children show not only improved detection but also improved memory and reasoning on tasks involving stimuli that are ecologically relevant to them. Finally, we discuss clinical implications of switching from conceptualizing stressed minds as “adapted” rather than “impaired.”