We examined the effects of incidental anger on perceived and actual polarization between Democrats and Republicans in the context of two national tragedies, Hurricane Katrina (Study 1) and the mass shooting that targeted Representative Gabrielle Giffords in Arizona (Study 2). We hypothesized that because of its relevance to intergroup conflict, incidental anger exacerbates the political polarization effects of issue partisanship (the correlation between partisan identification and partisan attitudes), and, separately, the correlation between conservative partisan identification and perceived polarization between Democrats and Republicans. We further hypothesized that these effects would be strongest for Republican identification because Republican leaders were targets of public criticism in both tragedies and because conservative (Republican) ideology tends to be more sensitive to threat. In the studies, participants first completed an emotion induction procedure by recalling autobiographical events that made them angry (Studies 1 & 2), sad (Studies 1 & 2), or that involved recalling emotionally neutral events (Study 2). Participants later reported their attitudes regarding the two tragedies, their perceptions of the typical Democrat’s and Republican’s attitudes on those issues, and their identification with the Democratic and Republican parties. Compared with incidental sadness (Studies 1 and 2) and a neutral condition (Study 2), incidental anger exacerbated the associations between Republican identification and partisan attitudes, and, separately between Republican identification and perceived polarization between the attitudes of Democrats and Republicans. We discuss implications for anger’s influence on political attitude formation and perceptions of group differences in political attitudes.

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In 1898 Thomas Youtsey was indicted on federal charges of embezzling and willfully misapplying some $60,000 as the cashier of the First National Bank of Newport, Kentucky.' Trial preparation was hampered by a series of severe epileptic attacks which impaired the defendant's memory to such an extent that he had trouble remembering even day-today events, let alone the transactions that were the basis of the indictment. Accordingly, counsel for Youtsey sought a continuance on the grounds that Youtsey's memory and judgment were impaired. In addition to offering the affidavits of three physicians who had examined the defendant, counsel was willing to have the defendant undergo any mental or physical exam that the court might find appropriate for determining whether the defendant should be tried. The court denied the motion for continuance, and the jury convicted Youtsey, rejecting defense arguments that Youtsey was not sane, or if sane, was so mentally impaired that he lacked the requisite mens rea for the crime charged. 2 On appeal, the Sixth Circuit reversed Youtsey's conviction, holding that the trial court's denial of the defense counsel's pretrial motion was erroneous. 3 The court noted that the defense motion, although nominally a motion for a continuance, was in reality aimed at preventing any trial due to the "present insanity" of the defendant. When the issue of "present insanity" is raised, the accused has the right to have that issue considered because "[ilt is not 'due process of law' to subject an insane person to trial upon an indictment involving liberty or life." 4 In support of its opinion, the Sixth Circuit cited a number of common law authorities. According to Hale, an incapacitated defendant "ought not by law to be arraigned .... but be remitted to prison until that incapacity be removed. The reason is because he cannot advisedly plead to the indictment." 5 The court quoted Bishop's Criminal Procedure: t Associate Professor of Law, University of Colorado. United States v. Youtsey, 91 F. 864 (C.C.D. Ky. 1898). 2 Id. at 871-72, 876, 880 (reporting in full the instructions of the trial court). 3 Youtsey v. United States, 97 F. 937 (6th Cir. 1899). Id. at 941. Id. at 940 (quoting M. HALE, THE HIsToRY OF THE PLEAS OF THE CROWN 34 (1847)). The University of Chicago Law Review An insane man cannot even plead to an indictment. Therefore, if, at the arraignment, counsel have reason to suppose their client too insane to take his trial, they should then make the objection, which, it is believed, can be adequately done orally to the court. Or the objection may proceed from a third person on affidavit, or the court may take it on its own observations.'

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