BackgroundWe describe the pioneering experience of a Spanish family pursuing the goal of understanding their own personal genetic data to the fullest possible extent using Direct to Consumer (DTC) tests. With full informed consent from the Corpas family, all genotype, exome and metagenome data from members of this family, are publicly available under a public domain Creative Commons 0 (CC0) license waiver. All scientists or companies analysing these data (“the Corpasome”) were invited to return results to the family.MethodsWe released 5 genotypes, 4 exomes, 1 metagenome from the Corpas family via a blog and figshare under a public domain license, inviting scientists to join the crowdsourcing efforts to analyse the genomes in return for coauthorship or acknowldgement in derived papers. Resulting analysis data were compiled via social media and direct email.ResultsHere we present the results of our investigations, combining the crowdsourced contributions and our own efforts. Four companies offering annotations for genomic variants were applied to four family exomes: BIOBASE, Ingenuity, Diploid, and GeneTalk. Starting from a common VCF file and after selecting for significant results from company reports, we find no overlap among described annotations. We additionally report on a gut microbiome analysis of a member of the Corpas family.ConclusionsThis study presents an analysis of a diverse set of tools and methods offered by four DTC companies. The striking discordance of the results mirrors previous findings with respect to DTC analysis of SNP chip data, and highlights the difficulties of using DTC data for preventive medical care. To our knowledge, the data and analysis results from our crowdsourced study represent the most comprehensive exome and analysis for a family quartet using solely DTC data generation to date.Electronic supplementary materialThe online version of this article (doi:10.1186/s12864-015-1973-7) contains supplementary material, which is available to authorised users.

As successive epidemics have swept the world, the scientific community has quickly learned from them about the emergence and transmission of communicable diseases. Epidemics usually occur when health systems are unprepared. During an unexpected epidemic, health authorities engage in damage control, fear drives action, and the desire to understand the threat is greatest. As humanity recovers, policy-makers seek scientific expertise to improve their "preparedness" to face future events.Global spread of disease is exemplified by the spread of yellow fever from Africa to the Americas, by the spread of dengue fever through transcontinental migration of mosquitos, by the relentless influenza virus pandemics, and, most recently, by the unexpected emergence of Ebola virus, spread by motorbike and long haul carriers. Other pathogens that are remarkable for their epidemic expansions include the arenavirus hemorrhagic fevers and hantavirus diseases carried by rodents over great geographic distances and the arthropod-borne viruses (West Nile, chikungunya and Zika) enabled by ecology and vector adaptations. Did we learn from the past epidemics? Are we prepared for the worst?The ultimate goal is to develop a resilient global health infrastructure. Besides acquiring treatments, vaccines, and other preventive medicine, bio-surveillance is critical to preventing disease emergence and to counteracting its spread. So far, only the western hemisphere has a large and established monitoring system; however, diseases continue to emerge sporadically, in particular in Southeast Asia and South America, illuminating the imperfections of our surveillance. Epidemics destabilize fragile governments, ravage the most vulnerable populations, and threaten the global community.Pandemic risk calculations employ new technologies like computerized maintenance of geographical and historical datasets, Geographic Information Systems (GIS), Next Generation sequencing, and Metagenomics to trace the molecular changes in pathogens during their emergence, and mathematical models to assess risk. Predictions help to pinpoint the hot spots of emergence, the populations at risk, and the pathogens under genetic evolution. Preparedness anticipates the risks, the needs of the population, the capacities of infrastructure, the sources of emergency funding, and finally, the international partnerships needed to manage a disaster before it occurs. At present, the world is in an intermediate phase of trying to reduce health disparities despite exponential population growth, political conflicts, migration, global trade, urbanization, and major environmental changes due to global warming. For the sake of humanity, we must focus on developing the necessary capacities for health surveillance, epidemic preparedness, and pandemic response.

SUMMARYThe emergence of human and animal rabies in Bali since November 2008 has attracted local, national and international interest. The potential origin and time of introduction of rabies virus to Bali is described. The nucleoprotein (N) gene of rabies virus from dog brain and human clinical specimens was sequenced using an automated DNA sequencer. Phylogenetic inference with Bayesian Markov Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) analysis using the Bayesian Evolutionary Analysis by Sampling Trees (BEAST) v. 1.7.5 software confirmed that the outbreak of rabies in Bali was caused by an Indonesian lineage virus following a single introduction. The ancestor of Bali viruses was the descendant of a virus from Kalimantan. Contact tracing showed that the event most likely occurred in early 2008. The introduction of rabies into a large unvaccinated dog population in Bali clearly demonstrates the risk of disease transmission for government agencies and should lead to an increased preparedness and efforts for sustained risk reduction to prevent such events from occurring in future.

The intentional release of traditional or combinatorial bioweapons remains one of the most important challenges that will continue to shape homeland security. The misuse of dual-use and how-to methods and techniques in the fields of molecular, synthetic, and computational biology can lessen the technical barriers for launching attacks, even for small groups or individuals. Bioinformatics is guiding the implementation of several biodefense countermeasures. However, existing algorithms have not effectively translated available pathogen genomic data into standardized diagnostics, rational vaccine development, or broad spectrum therapeutics. Despite its potential, bioinformatics has a limited impact on forensic and intelligence operations. More than 12 biodefense databases and information exchange architectures lack interoperability and a common layer that restricts scalability and the development of biodefense enterprises. Therefore, in order to use next-generation genome sequencing for medical intelligence, forensic operations, biothreat awareness, and mitigation, the attention has to be redirected toward the development of computational biology applications. This article debates some of the challenges that the bioinformatics field confronts in terms of biodefense problems and proposes potential opportunities to use pathogen genomic data. Issues related to the analysis of pathogen genomes and emerging methods including genomic barcoding, active curation, and knowledge management and their impact on intelligence, forensics, and policymaking are discussed.

Vibrio parahaemolyticus is a ubiquitous and abundant member of native microbial assemblages in coastal waters and shellfish. Though V. parahaemolyticus is predominantly environmental, some strains have infected human hosts and caused outbreaks of seafood-related gastroenteritis. In order to understand differences among clinical and environmental V. parahaemolyticus strains, we used high quality DNA sequencing data to compare the genomes of V. parahaemolyticus isolates ( n = 43) from a variety of geographic locations and clinical and environmental sample matrices. We used phylogenetic trees inferred from multilocus sequence typing (MLST) and whole-genome (WG) alignments, as well as a novel classification and genome clustering approach that relies on protein motif fingerprints (MFs), to assess relationships between V. parahaemolyticus strains and identify novel molecular targets associated with virulence. Differences in strain clustering at more than one position were observed between the MLST and WG phylogenetic trees. The WG phylogeny had higher support values and strain resolution since isolates of the same sequence type could be differentiated. The MF analysis revealed groups of protein motifs that were associated with the pathogenic MLST type ST36 and a large group of clinical strains isolated from human stool. A subset of the stool and ST36-associated protein motifs were selected for further analysis and the motif sequences were found in genes with a variety of functions, including transposases, secretion system components and effectors, and hypothetical proteins. DNA sequences associated with these protein motifs are candidate targets for future molecular assays in order to improve surveys of pathogenic V. parahaemolyticus in the environment and seafood.