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In recent years credit rating agencies have started rating firms who have not asked for a rating. Recipients of unsolicited ratings argue that the assigned ratings are too low and reflect a lack of comprehensive knowledge of the rated firms. We set out to examine these claims using a comprehensive and international sample of 1,060 bank ratings. Our results show that there is a significant difference in the distributions of ratings, and the shadow group has lower ratings. The results also indicate that banks that received shadow ratings are smaller and have weaker financial profiles than banks that have other ratings. This explains, in part, the lower ratings. In addition, we develop a model to explain bank ratings. The two-step treatment effects model shows that bank size, profitability, asset quality, liquidity, and sovereign credit risk are important factors in determining bank ratings. Copyright Blackwell Publishers Ltd, 2005.

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Using an international dataset, we examine the role of issuers' credit ratings in explaining corporate leverage and the speed with which firms adjust toward their optimal level of leverage. We find that, in countries with a more market-oriented financial system, the impact of credit ratings on firms' capital structure is more significant and that firms with a poorer credit rating adjust more rapidly. Furthermore, our results show some striking differences in the speed of adjusting capital structure between firms rated as speculative-and investment-grade, with the former adjusting much more rapidly. As hypothesized, those differences are statistically significant only for firms based in a more market-oriented economy.

Would the credit ratings of unsolicited banks be higher if they were solicited? Alternatively, would the credit ratings of solicited banks would be lower if they were unsolicited? To answer these questions, we use an endogenous regime-switching model and data from 460 commercial banks in 72 countries, excluding the United States, for the period 1998-2003. The answer to both questions is yes. Our results show that the observed differences between solicited and unsolicited ratings can be explained by both the solicitation status and financial profile of the banks. This finding is a new contribution to the literature. Copyright (c) 2009 The Ohio State University.