Explainable arti cially intelligent (XAI) systems form part of sociotechnical systems, e.g., human+AI teams tasked with making decisions. Yet, current XAI systems are rarely evaluated by measuring the performance of human+AI teams on actual decision-making tasks. We conducted two online experiments and one in-person think-aloud study to evaluate two currently common techniques for evaluating XAI systems: (1) using proxy, arti cial tasks such as how well humans predict the AI s decision from the given explanations, and (2) using subjective measures of trust and preference as predictors of actual performance. e results of our experiments demonstrate that evaluations with proxy tasks did not predict the results of the evaluations with the actual decision-making tasks. Further, the subjective measures on evaluations with actual decision-making tasks did not predict the objective performance on those same tasks. Our results suggest that by employing misleading evaluation methods, our eld may be inadvertently slowing its progress toward developing human+AI teams that can reliably perform be er than humans or AIs alone.

People supported by AI-powered decision support tools frequently overrely on the AI: they accept an AI's suggestion even when that suggestion is wrong. Adding explanations to the AI decisions does not appear to reduce the overreliance and some studies suggest that it might even increase it. Informed by the dual-process theory of cognition, we posit that people rarely engage analytically with each individual AI recommendation and explanation, and instead develop general heuristics about whether and when to follow the AI suggestions. Building on prior research on medical decision-making, we designed three cognitive forcing interventions to compel people to engage more thoughtfully with the AI-generated explanations. We conducted an experiment (N=199), in which we compared our three cognitive forcing designs to two simple explainable AI approaches and to a no-AI baseline. The results demonstrate that cognitive forcing significantly reduced overreliance compared to the simple explainable AI approaches. However, there was a trade-off: people assigned the least favorable subjective ratings to the designs that reduced the overreliance the most. To audit our work for intervention-generated inequalities, we investigated whether our interventions benefited equally people with different levels of Need for Cognition (i.e., motivation to engage in effortful mental activities). Our results show that, on average, cognitive forcing interventions benefited participants higher in Need for Cognition more. Our research suggests that human cognitive motivation moderates the effectiveness of explainable AI solutions.

We explore the effect of laughter perception and response in terms of engagement in human-robot interaction. We designed two distinct experiments in which the robot has two modes: laughter responsive and laughter non-responsive. In responsive mode, the robot detects laughter using a multimodal real-time laughter detection module and invokes laughter as a backchannel to users accordingly. In non-responsive mode, robot has no utilization of detection, thus provides no feedback. In the experimental design, we use a straightforward question-answer based interaction scenario using a back-projected robot head. We evaluate the interactions with objective and subjective measurements of engagement and user experience.

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