This paper focuses on the sustainable development dilemma of agricultural production in China under the pattern of intensive management, which is seriously challenged by agricultural non-point source pollution. The key to effectively break through the dilemma is to promote the co-governance of agricultural non-point source pollution control by stakeholders including local governments, new agricultural operators and traditional farmers. Accordingly, this paper discusses the interactive decision-making relationships between new agricultural operators and traditional farmers under the guidance of local governments, by constructing a trilateral evolutionary game model, as well as analyzing evolutionary cooperative stability strategies and realizing the simulation of evolution processes in different scenarios by MATLAB. The results show that new agricultural operators play a leading role in agricultural non-point source pollution control, whose strategies have effects such as technology spillover. The rewards from the superior government will support local governments in taking proactive action in the co-governance of agricultural non-point source pollution control, and then local governments can offer technical support and subsidies to new agricultural operators and traditional farmers for reducing their costs. Furthermore, this paper also finds that there are green synergy effects among the groups, where the variations of parameters and strategies by one group would affect the two others. Additionally, agricultural land operation rights transfers would cause traditional farmers to take more time to cooperate in the co-governance of agricultural non-point source pollution control. In order to promote the multi-agent co-governance of agricultural non-point source pollution control under intensive management pattern, this paper suggests that it should be necessary to reduce their costs and improve incentives, as well as to increase the common interests among groups and enhance their green synergy effects.

The diffusion of green agricultural production under intensive management pattern is an interactive process of strategy comparison and learning on complex networks among traditional farmers and new agricultural operation entities. Based on the theory of evolutionary game and complex networks, we construct evolutionary game models on the scale-free networks to simulate the evolution process of green agricultural production under the market mechanism and the government guidance mechanism, respectively. The comparison analysis results in different scenarios show that the stable state of the green agricultural production network is determined by interactions among the subjects. Detailed experimental results indicate that the double-score system under government guidance mechanism has a significant effect on the diffusion of the green agricultural production, of which the extra reward or penalty obtained from government is crucial. Besides, the diffusion of the green agricultural production under the market mechanism is mostly affected by the net profit of green agricultural production. These results are of great significance for increasing efficiency of government’s incentive and promoting the initiatives of traditional farmers and new agricultural operation entities in the green agricultural production.

This paper focuses on the sustainable development path of agricultural production in China under the pattern of intensive management, which aims to promote the agricultural green production networks consisting of new agricultural operators and traditional farmers. Based on these, this paper explores the evolution of agricultural green production networks through analyzing three interactive relationships among new agricultural operators and traditional farmers and constructing evolutionary game models on complex networks considering social preference and governments’ strong reciprocity, respectively. Then, the evolutionary stability strategies of these six evolutionary game models are analyzed, and the simulation of the evolution process of agricultural green production networks in different scenarios by MATLAB are realized. The results show that: (1) The evolutionary results of agricultural green production networks are positively correlated with the extra net profit of agricultural production operators. (2) If the extra net profit is positive, traditional farmers are more likely to adopt stable strategy of agricultural green production than new agricultural operators, while a few new agricultural operators would like to adopt the strategy of agricultural green production even though the extra net profit is low or negative. (3) The effect of social preference and governments’ strong reciprocity shows heterogeneity on the emergence of agricultural green production networks. When the net profit is enhanced, agricultural production operators with competitive preference would adopt the strategy of agricultural green production more quickly, as well as those agricultural production operators with social preference as governments’ strong reciprocity strengthened. As such, this paper suggests that it should be necessary to improve the net profit of agricultural green production by reducing costs and increasing benefits, encouraging agricultural production operators to cooperate in the agricultural green production networks to learn and share their green production experience.