A script analysis of the distribution of counterfeit alcohol across two European jurisdictions

Abstract

This article presents a script analysis of the distribution of counterfeit alcohols across two European jurisdictions. Based on an analysis of case file data from a European regulator and interviews with investigators, the article deconstructs the organisation of the distribution of the alcohol across jurisdictions into five scenes (collection, logistics, delivery, disposal, proceeds/finance) and analyses the actual (or likely permutations of) behaviours within each scene. The analysis also identifies underlying and routine activities and processes connecting each scene at the intersections of licit and illicit markets and networks as we see the 'integration', 'incorporation', 'de-integration' and 'allocation' of the illicit product at various stages and under particular conditions. Furthermore, the article analyses the required resources, equipment and relations of the distribution in addition to examining the actors involved by utilising a social network analysis to link specific actors to specific roles in specific scenes. Likely deception points in the script are presented in order to inform the intervention and disruption strategies of the regulator. Our core argument is that in this case, distribution is most Trends Organ Crim (2017) vulnerable where the illicit product is integrated into and then de-integrated out of the licit system and that increased capable guardianship is necessary at these critical points.

‘Being Affluent, One Drinks Wine’: Wine Counterfeiting in Mainland China

“…For the second theme, the article detailed some underlying and routine activities in the counterfeiting process (see also Lord et al 2017). No evidence suggests the involvement of IJCJ&SD 27 Online version via www.crimejusticejournal.com © 2018 7(4) organised crime rings in the wine counterfeiting trade, and the illicit economic sector in China appears to be made up of individuals and small and medium enterprises, similar to the counterfeiting phenomenon in the wine and spirits industry in the EU (see EU Intellectual Property Office 2016).…”

“…Several agencies under direct leadership of the SC are enforcement authorities in their particular fields of administration, as Figure 1 (Sun 2010;Zhao and Chu 2010). This is not surprising if we consider the common problems that appear in other countries, such as in the UK, where similar regulatory systems have been adopted, in which responsibility lies with multiple authorities with competing agendas (for example, Lord et al 2017). In the case of China, there are further challenges, as we shall see later in this section.…”

“…Similar to other enforcement systems, such as the UK's (see Lord et al 2017), a variety of authorities and agencies share responsibility for fighting alcohol counterfeiting in China, including, inter alia, the Ministry of Health (MoH, responsible for public health), China Food and Drug Administration (CFDA, responsible for food safety), the Anti-Counterfeiting Office (ACO, responsible for IPRs) and the Ministry of Public Security (MPS, responsible for criminal investigation). Figure 1 illustrates the administrative structure for the enforcement of the Food Safety Law 2009, which includes scrutiny of the alcohol industry.…”

“…Information sharing, for example, helps to holistically connect supply chains in the counterfeiting trade, which allows law enforcement to work seamlessly (Fassam and Dani 2017). However, information sharing is not always possible between different agencies within the same jurisdiction (see, for example, Lord et al 2017), let alone agencies in different administrative regions. This is also a shared problem.…”

In pursuit of food system integrity: the situational prevention of food fraud enterprise

“…adulteration may require different prevention mechanisms to mislabelling) and its underlying preparatory behaviours, called 'scripts' (i.e. deconstructing what has to be done and by whom in order to accomplish the fraud) (see Lord et al 2017b). However, empirical efforts demonstrated that it is not always clear which specific mechanisms will have the desired impact on the targeted criminal behaviour (see for example Kleemans et al 2010).…”