Accuracy of Event Data in the 2010 and 2011 Toyota Camry During Steady State and Braking Conditions

Ruth, Richard; Bartlett, Wade; Daily, Jeremy

doi:10.4271/2012-01-0999

Cited by 21 publications

(10 citation statements)

References 5 publications

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“…We answer these questions via an analysis of actual CAN traffic data. We use CAN data that was recorded from a 2010 Toyota Camry by Ruth et al [20]. During a 30-minute drive, the data was logged by a Gryphon S3 and Hercules software [20].…”

Section: Preceded Ids In Actual Can Trafficmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…We use CAN data that was recorded from a 2010 Toyota Camry by Ruth et al [20]. During a 30-minute drive, the data was logged by a Gryphon S3 and Hercules software [20]. According to the logged data, there were 42 distinct messages transmitted on the CAN bus: 39 of them sent periodically at intervals ranging from 10ms to 5 secs, and 3 of them sent sporadically.…”

Section: Preceded Ids In Actual Can Trafficmentioning

confidence: 99%

See 1 more Smart Citation

Error Handling of In-vehicle Networks Makes Them Vulnerable

Cho

Shin

2016

Proceedings of the 2016 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security

198

124

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Contemporary vehicles are getting equipped with an increasing number of Electronic Control Units (ECUs) and wireless connectivities. Although these have enhanced vehicle safety and efficiency, they are accompanied with new vulnerabilities. In this paper, we unveil a new important vulnerability applicable to several in-vehicle networks including Control Area Network (CAN), the de facto standard in-vehicle network protocol. Specifically, we propose a new type of Denial-of-Service (DoS), called the busoff attack, which exploits the error-handling scheme of in-vehicle networks to disconnect or shut down good/uncompromised ECUs. This is an important attack that must be thwarted, since the attack, once an ECU is compromised, is easy to be mounted on safetycritical ECUs while its prevention is very difficult. In addition to the discovery of this new vulnerability, we analyze its feasibility using actual in-vehicle network traffic, and demonstrate the attack on a CAN bus prototype as well as on two real vehicles. Based on our analysis and experimental results, we also propose and evaluate a mechanism to detect and prevent the bus-off attack.

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Section: Preceded Ids In Actual Can Trafficmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Preceded Ids In Actual Can Trafficmentioning

confidence: 99%

Error Handling of In-vehicle Networks Makes Them Vulnerable

Cho

Shin

2016

Proceedings of the 2016 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security

198

124

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…We primarily consider the periodical messages on the CAN bus because most of the messages on the CAN bus are sent periodically. Even in some models of vehicles, all the messages on the CAN bus are periodical [10,34,35]. We do not consider the nonperiodic messages in the proposed method.…”

Section: Problem Statementmentioning

confidence: 99%

Advanced Temperature-Varied ECU Fingerprints for Source Identification and Intrusion Detection in Controller Area Networks

Tian

Jiang

et al. 2020

Security and Communication Networks

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External wireless interfaces and the lack of security design of controller area network (CAN) standards make it vulnerable to CAN-targeting attacks. Unfortunately, various defense solutions have been proposed merely to detect CAN intrusion attacks, while only a few works are devoted to intrusion source identification. Demonstrated by our experimental studies, the most advanced IDS with intrusion source identification, which is based on the physical feature fingerprints of the in-vehicle Electronic Control Units (ECUs), will fail when the temperature changes. In this paper, we innovatively propose temperature-varied fingerprinting, called TVF, for CAN intrusion detection and intrusion source identification. Motivated by the remarkable observation that the physical feature of an ECU, i.e., its clock offset, changes linearly with the temperature of ECUs, the concept of temperature-varied fingerprints is proposed. Then, for a severe intrusion case, we provide an advanced TVF for further supplemented and expanded. The proposed advanced temperature-varied fingerprinting is implemented, and extensive performance evaluation experiments are conducted in both CAN bus prototype and real vehicles. The experimental results illustrate the effectiveness and performance of advanced TVF.

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“…As a physical property of an ECU, clock skew is considered to be stable over time, and thus the estimated values should be consistent, across 1) different batch sizes used by an IDS, 2) different portions of the same trace, and 3) different traces of the same ECU. Hence, we use the Toyota Camry dataset [49] that was used in [12] to compare the NTP-based IDS against the SOTA IDS in terms of estimation consistency. Fig.…”

Section: A Estimation Consistency Of Sota and Ntp-based Idssmentioning

confidence: 99%

Shape of the Cloak: Formal Analysis of Clock Skew-Based Intrusion Detection System in Controller Area Networks

Xiang

Sagong

Clark

et al. 2019

IEEE Trans.Inform.Forensic Secur.

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This paper presents a new masquerade attack called the cloaking attack and provides formal analyses for clock skewbased Intrusion Detection Systems (IDSs) that detect masquerade attacks in the Controller Area Network (CAN) in automobiles. In the cloaking attack, the adversary manipulates the message inter-transmission times of spoofed messages by adding delays so as to emulate a desired clock skew and avoid detection. In order to predict and characterize the impact of the cloaking attack in terms of the attack success probability on a given CAN bus and IDS, we develop formal models for two clock skew-based IDSs, i.e., the state-of-the-art (SOTA) IDS and its adaptation to the widely used Network Time Protocol (NTP), using parameters of the attacker, the detector, and the hardware platform. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first paper that provides formal analyses of clock skew-based IDSs in automotive CAN. We implement the cloaking attack on two hardware testbeds, a prototype and a real vehicle (the University of Washington (UW) EcoCAR), and demonstrate its effectiveness against both the SOTA and NTP-based IDSs. We validate our formal analyses through extensive experiments for different messages, IDS settings, and vehicles. By comparing each predicted attack success probability curve against its experimental curve, we find that the average prediction error is within 3.0% for the SOTA IDS and 5.7% for the NTP-based IDS.

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Accuracy of Event Data in the 2010 and 2011 Toyota Camry During Steady State and Braking Conditions

Cited by 21 publications

References 5 publications

Error Handling of In-vehicle Networks Makes Them Vulnerable

Error Handling of In-vehicle Networks Makes Them Vulnerable

Advanced Temperature-Varied ECU Fingerprints for Source Identification and Intrusion Detection in Controller Area Networks

Shape of the Cloak: Formal Analysis of Clock Skew-Based Intrusion Detection System in Controller Area Networks

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