Human sociality depends upon the benefits of mutual aid and extensive communication. However, diverse norms and preferences complicate mutual aid, and ambiguity in meaning hinders communication. Here we demonstrate that 3 these two problems can work together to enhance cooperation through the strategic use of deliberately ambiguous signals: covert signaling. Covert signaling is the transmission of information that is accurately received by its
IntroductionMuch research on human cooperation has focused on the free-rider problem: how to maintain cooperation when individuals' interests are opposed to those of the 24 group. However, individual interests are often aligned with those of the group, and these mutualistic scenarios may be equally important (Skyrms, 2004; Calcott, 2008; Tomasello et al., 2012;Smaldino, 2014). But mutualism provides a different 27 dilemma. When individuals differ in preferences or norms it is harder to efficiently coordinate. Forming reliable expectations of partner behavior that make coordination possible is therefore essential for the evolution of mutualism (Schelling, 1960).
30Consider, for example, a couple planning their Saturday. Chris wants to go to the opera; Pat wants to go to the monster truck rally. Each would rather do something together than alone, but each has a different preference (Luce & Raiffa, 33 1957). If such mismatches are sufficiently frequent, Chris and Pat might be better off finding new partners with better-aligned interests. Successful cooperation requires resolution of this clash of preferences. Human societies are replete with 36 dilemmas of this kind (Boyd & Richerson, 1994), and the need to efficiently coordinate extends to many forms of collective action (Ostrom, 2000 ences (Castro & Toro, 2007;Efferson et al., 2008; Mace & Holden, 2005; McElreath et al., 2003; Moffett, 2013; Nettle & Dunbar, 1997). Language can also serve as a marker for social coordination (Nettle & Dunbar, 1997), as can visible purchasing 51 and fashion choices (Berger & Heath, 2008;Smaldino et al., 2017). Communication is implicated in all these solutions. However, much communication is ambiguous. Is this ambiguity merely the result of constraints on the accuracy 54 of communication? It may naïvely appear that communication should have clarity as its goal. However, purposeful ambiguity may allow signalers flexibility and plausible deniability (Eisenberg, 1984;Pinker et al., 2008;Santana, 2014). Previ-57 ous work has illustrated how leaders may use ambiguous language to rally diverse followers (Eisenberg, 1984), politicians may use vague platforms to avoid committing to specific policies (Aragonès & Neeman, 2000), and suitors may mask their 60 flirtations to be viewed innocuously if their affections are unreciprocated (Gersick & Kurzban, 2014 (Kaufman, 1967; Wolosin, 1975;Fischer, 2009;Hruschka, 2010; Toma et al., 72 2012). To be clear, we focus on those aspects of individual variation for which similarity enhances cooperation-these include norms, values, and identity (Smaldi...