All things considered duties to believe

Booth, Anthony Robert

doi:10.1007/s11229-010-9857-5

Cited by 25 publications

(11 citation statements)

References 5 publications

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Order By: Relevance

“…A virtue epistemologist (that is, a consequentialist who thinks that we should promote the agent’s intellectual virtues) might say that a delusion is epistemically beneficial if it contributes to the promotion of, say, intellectual curiosity and honesty (see Greco [2012] ). A deontologist may be less concerned about the benefits that a delusion brings, as she does not think about epistemic evaluation in terms of the consequences of having a certain cognition (see Booth [2012] ); but she may be interested in whether the adoption of other hypotheses was genuinely available to the agent prior to forming the delusion. If the agent’s ability to believe otherwise were compromised, then the deontologist may not regard the agent as responsible or blameworthy for the adoption of the delusional hypothesis.…”

Section: Epistemic Innocencementioning

confidence: 99%

Epistemic Benefits of Elaborated and Systematized Delusions in Schizophrenia

Bortolotti¹

2016

The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

In this article I ask whether elaborated and systematized delusions emerging in the context of schizophrenia have the potential for epistemic innocence. Cognitions are epistemically innocent if they have significant epistemic benefits that could not be attained otherwise. In particular, I propose that a cognition is epistemically innocent if it delivers some significant epistemic benefit to a given agent at a given time, and if alternative cognitions delivering the same epistemic benefit are unavailable to that agent at that time. Elaborated and systematized delusions in schizophrenia are typically false and exemplify failures of rationality and self-knowledge. Empirical studies suggest that they may have psychological benefits by relieving anxiety and enhancing meaningfulness. Moreover, these delusions have been considered as adaptive in virtue of the fact that they enable automated learning to resume after a significant disruption caused by incorrect prediction-error signalling. I argue that such psychological benefits and adaptive features also have positive epistemic consequences. More precisely, delusions can be a means to restoring epistemic functionality in agents who are overwhelmed by hypersalient experiences in the prodromal stage of psychosis. The analysis leads to a more complex view of the epistemic status of delusions than is found in the contemporary philosophical literature and has some implications for clinical practice. 1 Introduction2 Types of Delusions3 What Is Wrong with Elaborated and Systematized Delusions?4 Finding Life Meaningful5 Learning Resumed6 Epistemic Innocence7 Epistemic Benefit8 No Alternatives9 Conclusions and Implications

show abstract

Section: Epistemic Innocencementioning

confidence: 99%

Epistemic Benefits of Elaborated and Systematized Delusions in Schizophrenia

Bortolotti¹

2016

The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…For example, the following view does not treat all states in precisely the same way, even though there is a superficial sense in which it applies the same rule to each state: For all states S, S is rational just in case either (1) S is a belief state in which the proposition believed is supported by the evidence; or (2) S is not a belief state, and S has (or ties for) highest expected value. 4 A view in the general vicinity of this one is defended in Booth (2012). 5 Proponents of Exceptionalism about belief may also defend exceptionalist views about other mental states, like intention, fear, regret, hope, etc.…”

Section: Equal Treatmentmentioning

confidence: 99%

No Exception for Belief

Rinard

2015

Philos Phenomenol Research

119

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

This paper defends a principle I call Equal Treatment, according to which the rationality of a belief is determined in precisely the same way as the rationality of any other state. For example, if wearing a raincoat is rational just in case doing so maximizes expected value, then believing some proposition P is rational just in case doing so maximizes expected value. This contrasts with the popular view that the rationality of belief is determined by evidential support. It also contrasts with the common idea that in the case of belief, there are two different incommensurable senses of rationality, one of which is distinctively epistemic. I present considerations that favor Equal Treatment over these two alternatives, reply to objections, and criticize some arguments for Evidentialism. I also show how Equal Treatment opens the door to a distinctive kind of response to skepticism.

show abstract

“…See, e.g., BonJour, ; Booth, ; Petersen, ; and Smithies, . Notice that my definition of deontological internalism leaves out deontological views where justification is permissible belief.…”

mentioning

confidence: 94%

Ampliative Transmission and Deontological Internalism

Oliveira

2015

Pacific Philosophical Qtr

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Deontological internalism is the family of views where justification is a positive deontological appraisal of someone's epistemic agency: S is justified, that is, when S is blameless, praiseworthy, or responsible in believing that p. Brian Weatherson discusses very briefly how a plausible principle of ampliative transmission reveals a worry for versions of deontological internalism formulated in terms of epistemic blame. Weatherson denies, however, that similar principles reveal similar worries for other versions. I disagree. In this article, I argue that plausible principles of ampliative transmission reveal a worry for deontological internalism in general.

show abstract

All things considered duties to believe

Cited by 25 publications

References 5 publications

Epistemic Benefits of Elaborated and Systematized Delusions in Schizophrenia

Epistemic Benefits of Elaborated and Systematized Delusions in Schizophrenia

No Exception for Belief

Ampliative Transmission and Deontological Internalism

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About