An Epistemic Approach to Coercion-Resistance for Electronic Voting Protocols

Kuesters, R.; Truderung, Tomasz

doi:10.1109/sp.2009.13

Cited by 45 publications

(40 citation statements)

References 33 publications

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“…However, as pointed out in [15], it has no well-agreed formal definition for the concept of voter-coercion resistance; it is usually only stated in natural language. Juels et al proposed a computational definition in [12], and authors in [44] analyzed voter-coercion resistance in an epistemic approach. [25] divided voter-coercion into two categories: explicit coercion and silent coercion, where silent coercion also takes credential leakage into account.…”

Section: Voter-coercion Resistancementioning

confidence: 99%

Receipt-freeness and coercion resistance in remote E-voting systems

Ruan

Zou

2017

IJSN

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Remote Electronic Voting (E-voting) is a more convenient and efficient methodology when compared with traditional voting systems. It allows voters to vote for candidates remotely, however, remote E-voting systems have not yet been widely deployed in practical elections due to several potential security issues, such as vote-privacy, robustness and verifiability. Attackers' targets can be either voting machines or voters. In this paper, we mainly focus on three important security properties related to voters: receipt-freeness, voteselling resistance, and voter-coercion resistance. In such scenarios, voters are willing or forced to cooperate with attackers. We provide a survey of existing remote E-voting systems, to see whether or not they are able to satisfy these three properties to avoid corresponding attacks. Furthermore, we identify and summarize what mechanisms they use in order to satisfy these three security properties.

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Section: Voter-coercion Resistancementioning

confidence: 99%

Receipt-freeness and coercion resistance in remote E-voting systems

Ruan

Zou

2017

IJSN

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“…This approach is extended in [4] to handle forced abstention attacks explicitly. The epistemic approach of [5] takes a similar view of coercion-resistance.…”

Section: A Definitionsmentioning

confidence: 99%

A Formal Framework for Modelling Coercion Resistance and Receipt Freeness

Heather

Schneider

2012

FM 2012: Formal Methods

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Abstract-Coercion resistance and receipt freeness are critical properties for any voting system. However, many definitions of these properties have been proposed, with varying levels of formality, and there has been little attempt to tie these definitions together or identify relations between them.We give here a general framework for specifying different coercion resistance and receipt freeness properties using the process algebra CSP. The framework is general enough to accommodate a wide range of definitions, including dealing with randomization attacks and forced abstention.We provide models of some simple voting systems, and show how the framework can be used to analyze these models under different definitions of coercion resistance and receipt freeness. Our formalisation highlights the variation between the definitions in the literature.

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“…[8]). Moreover, according to [8,17], coercion-resistance implies receipt-freeness, while [4] claims that it is possible to have a voting scheme which is coercion-resistant and yet not receiptfree. These contradictory assertions show that the concept of anonymity requires clarification as well.…”

Section: Background and Motivationmentioning

confidence: 99%

Anonymity and Verifiability in Voting: Understanding (Un)Linkability

Langer

Jonker

Pieters

2010

Information and Communications Security

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Abstract. Anonymity and verifiability are crucial security requirements for voting. Still, they seem to be contradictory, and confusion exists about their precise meanings and compatibility. In this paper, we resolve the confusion by showing that both can be expressed in terms of (un)linkability: while anonymity requires unlinkability of voter and vote, verifiability requires linkability of voters and election result. We first provide a conceptual model which captures anonymity as well as verifiability. Second, we express the semantics of (un)linkability in terms of (in)distinguishability. Third, we provide an adversary model that describes which capabilities the attacker has for establishing links. These components form a comprehensive model for describing and analyzing voting system security. In a case study we use our model to analyze the security of the voting scheme Prêtà Voter. Our work contributes to a deeper understanding of anonymity and verifiability and their correlation in voting.

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An Epistemic Approach to Coercion-Resistance for Electronic Voting Protocols

Cited by 45 publications

References 33 publications

Receipt-freeness and coercion resistance in remote E-voting systems

Receipt-freeness and coercion resistance in remote E-voting systems

A Formal Framework for Modelling Coercion Resistance and Receipt Freeness

Anonymity and Verifiability in Voting: Understanding (Un)Linkability

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