Aristotle, agents, and actions

What's Aristotelian about neo‐Aristotelian Virtue Ethics?

“… Both Brown () and Vasiliou () argue, as I will, that Aristotle does not endorse a “priority of virtue” view according to which the goodness of virtuous actions is explained by reference to virtue of character. Brown suggests that it might be the responses of the virtuous agent, rather than virtue of character, that is prior to and explanatory of virtuous actions.…”

“…Vasiliou rejects a common misreading of NE 2.4, but ultimately argues that an action does not count as fully virtuous unless it is performed by a virtuous agent; like Brown, he does not seem to me to be fully distancing Aristotle from a priority of virtue reading. Korsgaard (), Whiting (), and Vasiliou () all offer ways of thinking about how a virtuous agent can perform a virtuous action for the sake of its good results while still choosing it for its own sake. Whiting () also offers a way of understanding how choosing a virtuous action for its own sake is a way of choosing it for the sake of eudaimonia ; my positive view shares a number of similarities with hers though we differ in the explanation of how being virtuous is a way of achieving eudaimonia .…”

“…See also Jimenez () esp. p. 12‐24, and Vasiliou (), p. 173‐183. Jimenez defends something like the distinction I argue for here between a virtuous action and acting virtuously.…”

“… For a version of this epistemological reading, see also Brown () esp. 78‐79, and Vasiliou () esp. 176‐179.…”

“… As Whiting () p. 280 argues, “[T]alk of choosing a virtuous action for itself is thus elliptical for talk of aiming at a certain sort of result for it self – elliptical, that is, for talk of aiming at a certain sort of result simply for the sake of that result ”. See also Vasiliou () p. 182‐3. …”