Choice is Not True or False: The Domain of Rhetorical Argumentation

Kock, Christian

doi:10.1007/s10503-008-9115-x

Cited by 65 publications

(47 citation statements)

References 25 publications

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“…El problema señalado a la teoría de la argumentación elaborada por Chaïm Perelman, radicado en que ésta descuida el carácter normativo de la argumentación (Van Eemeren, 2011, p. 58), podría comprenderse como un efecto de su énfasis en lo propio de la argumentación práctica; énfasis realizado en detrimento de lo general que ésta comparte con la argumentación teórica. Asimismo, el problema señalado a la teoría pragmadialéctica de la argumentación, consistente en que ésta desconoce que lo propio del discurso deliberativo es la elección y no la verdad (Kock, 2009), podría entenderse como un efecto del énfasis en la racionalidad característica de la argumentación teórica, realizado en detrimento de lo específico de la argumentación práctica.…”

Section: Comprensión Del Concepto De Argumentaciónunclassified

¿Qué es la argumentación práctica?

Gómez

2017

Co-herencia

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Section: Comprensión Del Concepto De Argumentaciónunclassified

¿Qué es la argumentación práctica?

Gómez

2017

Co-herencia

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“…After the cautious conclusion that he considers it "an anachronism to find in Aristotle the thesis that logic, dialectic and rhetoric are three perspectives on argumentation" (p. 155), Blair next turns to what he considers an alternative to Wenzel's perspectival model, proposed by Kock (2009) and shared, at least partly, by Tindale (1999) and Hauser (2002), namely the view that the main difference between the fields is their topical domain. I shall return to this alternative in section three below.…”

Section: Blair's Tripartite Distinctionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…1 Blair challenges Wenzel's widespread view (1990) that the difference resides in three perspectives, relating to process, procedure, and product. He furthermore questions the alternative view proposed by especially Kock (2009) that the distinguishing feature is the topical domain of the field. Blair then introduces his alternative: rhetoric studies arguments in speeches, dialectics in conversations, and logic studies good reasoning in both.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Rhetoric, Dialectic and Logic: The Wild-Goose Chase for an Essential Distinction

Jørgensen

2014

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Taking Blair's recent contribution to the debate about the triad as its starting point, the article discusses and challenges attempts to reduce the intricate relationship between rhetoric, dialectic and logic to a trichotomy with watertight compartments or to separate them with a single clear-cut criterion. I argue that efforts to pinpoint an essential difference, among the various typical differences partly grounded in disciplinary traditions, obscure the complexities within the fields.As a consequence, crosscutting properties of the fields as well as the possibilities for theoretical bridging between them are neglected.Résumé: Je prends comme point de départ la récente contribution de Blair au débat sur la rhétorique, la dialectique et la logique et je conteste les tentatives de réduire leurs interrelations à une trichotomie formée de compartiments étanches ou les tentatives de séparer ces trois domaines de l'argumentation avec un seul critère clair. Je soutiens que les efforts d'identifier une différence essentielle entre les différences typiques partiellement fondées sur les traditions disciplinaires masquent leur complexité dans les disciplines. En conséquence, les propriétés transversales de ces disciplines ainsi que les possibilités de pontage théorique entre elles sont negligees.

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“…Further to the left of Plato is the domain of genuinely rhetorical argumentation, which has been claimed to be that part of discursive reality where a clash of moral and political values is inevitable (e.g., Kock 2009 andMeyer 2010). Farthest to the left, rhetoric has even been claimed to create knowledge rather than serve to communicate it well (Scott 1967).…”

Section: Rhetoric As Deliberative and Rhetoric As Epistemicmentioning

confidence: 99%

What Do Normative Approaches to Argumentation Stand to Gain from Rhetorical Insights?

Zenker

2013

Philosophy &Amp; Rhetoric

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This article appropriates Thomas Conley's (1990) four classical positions on the nature and function of rhetoric, and assesses their relevance vis-à-vis three contemporary normative approaches to argumentation: the epistemological approach, pragma-dialectical theory, and informal logic. In each case, the room for the integration of rhetorical insights into argument evaluation is found to be restricted by dialectical and logico-epistemic norms endorsed in these approaches. Moreover, when rhetorical insights could fit the so restricted room, then the reliability and the specificity of such insights remain inversely related, with methodologically well-hardened knowledge of what persuades remaining too general. The trade-off between reliability and specificity of suasory knowledge, or so is our thesis, undermines the claim that rhetorical insights can presently inform the evaluation of natural language arguments in these three normative approaches.

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Choice is Not True or False: The Domain of Rhetorical Argumentation

Cited by 65 publications

References 25 publications

¿Qué es la argumentación práctica?

¿Qué es la argumentación práctica?

Rhetoric, Dialectic and Logic: The Wild-Goose Chase for an Essential Distinction

What Do Normative Approaches to Argumentation Stand to Gain from Rhetorical Insights?

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