11th Pacific Rim International Symposium on Dependable Computing (PRDC'05)
DOI: 10.1109/prdc.2005.27
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Contribution of Controller Area Networks Controllers to Masquerade Failures

Abstract: This paper scrutinizes faults in a CAN controller that may result in masquerade failures, and suggests an even parity mechanism to detect them with minimum hardware overhead. To do this, a CAN controller is modeled by VHDL at behavioral level and is exploited to setup a CAN-based network composed of two nodes. A total of 5,500 faults are injected into essential parts of one of the controllers. The results show that about 3.44% of faults terminate in masquerade failures. The results, also, show that Register ba… Show more

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Cited by 13 publications
(8 citation statements)
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“…In general, fault-injection hooks imple mented in software simply have limited access to the in ternal functions of hardware communication controllers. However, methods using simulated hardware models have been successfully employed to inject faults directly in CAN [10,12] and FlexRay [9] controllers. We had hoped that the simulated controller in CANoe would allow similar trans parency.…”
Section: Lessons Learnedmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…In general, fault-injection hooks imple mented in software simply have limited access to the in ternal functions of hardware communication controllers. However, methods using simulated hardware models have been successfully employed to inject faults directly in CAN [10,12] and FlexRay [9] controllers. We had hoped that the simulated controller in CANoe would allow similar trans parency.…”
Section: Lessons Learnedmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…However, severe limitations concerning reliability have been identified in literature such as the ability of a single faulty node to cause a global communication failure by monopolizing the bus [1], the susceptibility to bus shortcircuits [2] or the absence of an atomic broadcast in case of asymmetric bit flips [3,4]. In addition, CAN exhibits diagnostic deficiencies such as the inability to trace back faulty message identifications to the sender nodes [5].…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Effects of masquerade failures [7] and message missing failures [8] have been studied for the CAN protocol by the simulation-based fault injection. Also, in [9], effects of simulation-based fault injection in the CAN protocol has been investigated.…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%