Electoral Strategy under Open-List Proportional Representation

Ames, Barry

doi:10.2307/2111619

Cited by 493 publications

(275 citation statements)

References 8 publications

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“…As re-election depends on their personal performance, MPs would develop closer links with citizens (Lawson, 1980;Mitchell, 2000;Römmele et al, 2005) and would pay attention to personal relations -even if only as a means to personal vote chasing. Some authors have articulated this idea through the concept of "reputation" (Curtice & Shively, 2009: 173), whereas others preferred the looser "representative role" of MPs (Farrell & McAllister, 2006: 725-727;Ames, 1995). Carey and Shugart (1995: 418-419) even use both concepts.…”

Section: Theoretical Backgroundmentioning

confidence: 99%

Ballot Structure and Satisfaction with Democracy

Bosch¹,

Orriols²

2014

Journal of Elections, Public Opinion and Parties

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This paper analyzes the influence of ballot structure over satisfaction with democracy. In line with previous literature, we hypothesize that some ballot structures -such as preferential ballots -generate more satisfaction with democracy than closed ones. Yet, we expect these differences to be especially relevant among the more knowledgeable electorate, since any open ballot structure requires more sophisticated voters. Using CSES surveys, our results do not show a clear and parsimonious relation between ballot openness and satisfaction with democracy as some previous research seems to suggest. Our findings rather suggest that is preferential ballots and open lists the only ballot structures that generate more satisfaction than most of the remaining ballot structures. Yet, this relation is restricted only among the more knowledgeable electorate. The liberty of choice that ballot structure offers only concerns a reduced portion of the electorate, namely the more politically sophisticated one.

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Section: Theoretical Backgroundmentioning

confidence: 99%

Ballot Structure and Satisfaction with Democracy

Bosch¹,

Orriols²

2014

Journal of Elections, Public Opinion and Parties

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“…Carey (2009), Desposato (2006), Morgenstern (2004)), the content and targeting of public goods (cf. Ames (1995), Crisp et al (2004)), and more distal outcomes such as corruption (cf. Gingerich 2009, Golden andChang (2001), Persson, Tabellini, and Trebbi (2003)).…”

Section: Theses About the Consequences Of The Australian Ballotmentioning

confidence: 99%

Can Institutions Cure Clientelism? Assessing the Impact of the Australian Ballot in Brazil

Gingerich

2013

SSRN Journal

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Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. The opinions expressed in this publication are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Inter-American Development Bank, its Board of Directors, or the countries they represent. Terms of use: Documents inThe unauthorized commercial use of Bank documents is prohibited and may be punishable under the Bank's policies and/or applicable laws. Copyright ©Inter-American Development Bank. This working paper may be reproduced for any non-commercial purpose. It may also be reproduced in any academic journal indexed by the American Economic Association's EconLit, with previous consent by the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB), provided that the IDB is credited and that the author(s) receive no income from the publication. This paper examines how the adoption of the Australian ballot (AB), and ipso facto, the transition from the nominal to effective secret vote, shaped the nature of party politics in Brazil. Engaging the literature on political clientelism, the impact of the AB on three outcomes is studied: 1) the ideological leanings of voters at the ballot box; 2) the degree of electoral control enjoyed by local vote brokers; and 3) the capacity of citizens to effectively participate in the electoral process. In order to get leverage on these issues, the paper utilizes an original dataset-painstakingly assembled from regional electoral archives-which contains municipal-level vote returns for federal deputy and senate contests during the period before and after the AB's introduction in Brazil (1958Brazil ( -1962. The dataset exploits the fact that the AB was introduced at different times in different states and for different offices in the country, thereby creating an unprecedented opportunity to assess the impact of this institution. Using a triple difference-in-difference procedure, the study finds that the AB: 1) shifted the ideological balance of power from Right to Left; 2) did not greatly weaken the hand of vote brokers; and 3) greatly increased the proportion of wasted votes cast in elections. Cataloging-in-PublicationJEL Classification: K, O17, D72, N4, N46

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“…Há referências freqüentes na literatura sobre o Congresso Nacional de que ele está constantemente comprometido com questões locais: a estratégia básica dos políticos em busca da reeleição é a de se posicionarem em favor de políticas paroquialistas (Ames, 1995a(Ames, , 1995b do processo decisório no Congresso, têm mostrado que essa imagem não corresponde à realidade, já que a maioria das normas sancionadas é de cunho nacional (Figueiredo e Limongi, 1998;Lemos, 2001;Amorim Neto e Santos, 2002;Ricci, 2003).…”

Section: Os Projetos De Lei Despachados à Capr: Análise Dos Dadosunclassified

“…Para quem acentua a componente relativa à arena eleitoral, e não a parlamentar, é a estrutura da competição eleitoral que determina o comportamento do deputado e, conseqüentemen-te, o tipo de projeto que ele tende a apresentar. Em particular, dado um sistema eleitoral fortemente centrado sobre as características do candidato, a produção legislativa ordinária é, sobretudo, um procedimento para processar quaisquer demandas provenientes dos próprios eleitores; e isso significaria, em última instância, o domínio da prática paroquialista (Ames, 1995a(Ames, , 1995b. Entretanto, o foco na organização dos trabalhos internos ao Congresso Nacional, evidencia como o investimento em políticas paroquiais não tem fundamento empírico (Figueiredo e Limongi, 1999;Lemos, 2001;Amorim Neto e Santos, 2002;Ricci, 2003).…”

unclassified

Produção legislativa e preferências eleitorais na Comissão de Agricultura e Política Rural da Câmara dos Deputados

Ricci¹,

Lemos²

2004

Rev. bras. Ci. Soc.

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IntroduçãoComo as comissões permanentes afetam as escolhas legislativas do Congresso brasileiro? Muitos cientistas políticos têm observado que, nos parlamentos modernos, o elemento organizacional mais comum a ser encontrado são as comissões permanentes (Strom, 1998, p. 55), uma área abundante e ainda promissora nos estudos legislativos. O interesse dos estudiosos é facilmente entendido.De fato, ao constituírem-se em grupos menores do que o plenário, as comissões favorecem a participação de grupos organizados, facilitam o trabalho de coleta e distribuição de informações, diminuem os custos de decisão, abrem espaço para a participação mais ativa das minorias, propiciam ambiente de negociação e consenso e permitem que os representantes possam atingir seus objetivos -sejam eles a realização de determinada política pú-blica, a vocalização de grupos de interesse, sejam sua própria reeleição. A evidência, baseada na simples observação, mostra que as comissões permanentes com funções legislativas integram a estrutura organizacional da maioria dos parlamentos. Na Europa, o número médio de comissões permanentes varia entre dez e vinte por parlamento (Mattson e Strom, 1995).

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Electoral Strategy under Open-List Proportional Representation

Cited by 493 publications

References 8 publications

Ballot Structure and Satisfaction with Democracy

Ballot Structure and Satisfaction with Democracy

Can Institutions Cure Clientelism? Assessing the Impact of the Australian Ballot in Brazil

Produção legislativa e preferências eleitorais na Comissão de Agricultura e Política Rural da Câmara dos Deputados

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