Essence and Modality

Abstract

† I'd like to thank Adriano Palma and Sacha Bourgeois-Gironde for inviting me to prepare this material and present it at theÉcole Normale Supérieur, in Paris, in May 2002. I'd also like to thank Jeffrey Kegler and Paul Oppenheimer for carefully reading the intermediate and final draft of the paper, respectively, and sending critical comments. Finally, I'd like to thank Philip Percival, a referee for Mind , for several excellent observations as to how to make the paper better. Edward N. Zalta 2 ('[λy y ∈{s}]') is essential to Socrates ('s') from the assumption that having Socrates as an element ('[λy s ∈ y]') is essential to singleton Socrates ('{s}'): Proof : Suppose [λy s ∈ y] is essential to {s}. Then, by (E) above, 2(E!{s} → [λy s ∈ y]{s}), and by λ-conversion, it follows that 2(E!{s} → s ∈ {s}). But, it is a principle of modal set theory that necessarily, singleton Socrates exists iff Socrates exists, i.e., 2(E!{s} ≡ E!s). So, 2(E!s → s ∈ {s}). 1 And by λ-conversion, 2(E!s → [λy y ∈ {s}]s). Thus, by (E) again, [λy y ∈{s}] is essential to Socrates. Thus, (E) and modal set theory lead to a result contrary to the stated intuition. One cannot accept (E), modal set theory, and that singleton Socrates essentially has Socrates as an element without also accepting that Socrates is essentially an element of singleton Socrates. Although one might conclude that the problem here is with modal set theory, Fine suggests that the problem goes deeper, and has more to do with (E) than with modal set theory. He develops a second counterexample to (E) (1994a, 5): Consider two objects whose natures are unconnected, say Socrates and the Eiffel Tower. Then it is necessary that Socrates and the Tower be distinct. But it is not essential to Socrates that he be distinct from the Tower; for there is nothing in his nature which connects him in any special way to it.

Essence and Intrinsicality

“…This simplification is harmless as long as impurely extrinsic properties all factor into a purely extrinsic property on the one hand and an intrinsic property on the other, which I think they do, though I won't argue for that here.¹⁵)  I'm not the only one-see also Della Rocca (1996), Gorman (2005), Zalta (2006), and Correia (2007). So redness, being 3 kg, and roundness are intrinsic properties.…”

“…When we say that x has F essentially, usually we don't just mean that x couldn't survive the  Though see Zalta (2006) for whom even ordinary concrete objects exist essentially (but are only contingently concrete). For one thing, it doesn't really seem basic enough to make an attractive primitive.…”

“…Does restricting  See Della Rocca (1996), Gorman (2005), Zalta (2006), and Correia (2007) for other ways to analyze Fine-style counterexamples' failure to be fully "about" their instances. Are Boolean consequences of essential properties also essential?…”

What is Absolute Necessity?

“…Anything we can talk about is a thing. [Fine 1994[Fine , 1995, with whose view mine has some significant affinities; see also [Zalta 2006] and [Lowe 2008]. A comparative assessment is beyond the scope of this paper, and would, however illuminating, distract from my main purposes.…”

Against the reduction of modality to essence

“…4 See e.g. Zalta (2006), Cowling (2013), Wildman (2013), Brogaard and Salerno (2013), Denby (2014), and Livingstone-Banks (2017); for critical discussion, see Skiles (2015), Wildman (2016), and Steward (2015). 5 Essence can here be understood as primitive (Fine 1994a(Fine , b, 1995a, or in non-modal terms (e.g.…”