Exploiting a cognitive bias promotes cooperation in social dilemma experiments

Wang, Zhen; Jusup, Marko; Ши, Лей; Lee, Joung Hun; Iwasa, Yoh; Boccaletti, Stefano

doi:10.1038/s41467-018-05259-5

Cited by 232 publications

(68 citation statements)

References 40 publications

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“…The role of punishment in social dilemma experiments has been recently reexamined in Li et al [11]. Cognitive biases, when a decoy option is available in the social dilemma may also help to promote cooperation [12]. Such behaviors have been attributed to various causes by different authors and, indeed, what people do strongly depends on the information they are given about the other players' actions [13][14][15][16][17][18][19].…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Public Goods Games on Coevolving Social Network Models

Tomassini

Antonioni

2020

Front. Phys.

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Public good games are a metaphor for modeling cooperative behavior in groups in the presence of incentives to free ride. In the model presented here agents play a public good game with their neighbors in a social network structure. Agents' decision rules in our model are inspired by elementary learning observed in laboratory and online behavioral experiments involving human participants with the same amount of information, i.e., when individuals only know their own current contribution and their own cumulated payoff. In addition, agents in the model are allowed to severe links with groups in which their payoff is lower and create links to a new randomly chosen group. Reinforcing the results obtained in network scenarios where agents play Prisoner's Dilemma games, we show that thanks to this relinking possibility, the whole system reaches higher levels of average contribution with respect to the case in which the network cannot change. Our setup opens new frameworks to be investigated, and potentially confirmed, through controlled human experiments.

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Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Public Goods Games on Coevolving Social Network Models

Tomassini

Antonioni

2020

Front. Phys.

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“…This is very similar to reciprocal altruism in biology. Recent research has also explored the impact of cognitive bias and punishment on cooperation in social dilemma experiments (Wang et al 2018, Li et al, 2018, and indeed ample theoretical research has also been devoted to discovering what might promote cooperation in repeated social dilemmas in general (Wang et al, 2015, Perc and Szolnoki, 2010, Perc et al, 2017, Tanimoto 2018, Ito and Tanimoto, 2018.…”

Section: Social Challenges Of Artificial Intelligencementioning

confidence: 99%

Social and juristic challenges of artificial intelligence

2019

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Artificial intelligence is becoming seamlessly integrated into our everyday lives, augmenting our knowledge and capabilities in driving, avoiding traffic, finding friends, choosing the perfect movie, and even cooking a healthier meal. It also has a significant impact on many aspects of society and industry, ranging from scientific discovery, healthcare and medical diagnostics to smart cities, transport and sustainability. Within this 21st century 'man meets machine' reality unfolding, several social and juristic challenges emerge for which we are poorly prepared. We here review social dilemmas where individual interests are at odds with the interests of others, and where artificial intelligence might have a particularly hard time making the right decision. An example thereof is the well-known social dilemma of autonomous vehicles. We also review juristic challenges, with a focus on torts that are at least partly or seemingly due to artificial intelligence, resulting in the claimant suffering a loss or harm. Here the challenge is to determine who is legally liable, and to what extent. We conclude with an outlook and with a short set of guidelines for constructively mitigating described challenges.

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“…Over the last few decades, evolutionary game theory [13], combining game theory with dynamical analysis, has provided a simple and forceful mathematical framework to describe and analyze the conflict of interest among selfish and unrelated individuals as social conflict is similar to the competition of individuals for limited resources. In particular, the prisoner's dilemma game (PDG) [14,15] and snowdrift game (SDG) [16,17], as the simplest models, represent different social dilemmas and mode of conflicts, which endow typical paradigms to explain the persistence and emergence of cooperation among selfish individuals, and have achieved a series of fruitful results [18][19][20][21][22][23][24] [see references [25,26] for more recent information]. In the traditional PDG and SDG, it is known that two involved individuals must simultaneously decide either to cooperate or to defect without knowing the choice of the opponent in the processes of the game.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Effects of Reciprocal Rewarding on the Evolution of Cooperation in Voluntary Social Dilemmas

Wang

Xia

et al. 2019

Front. Phys.

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Voluntary participation, as an effective mechanism to promote cooperation in game theory, has been widely concerned. In the meanwhile, reciprocal rewarding plays an important role in motivating individual initiative. Inspired by this phenomenon, we investigate the effect of reciprocal rewarding on the evolutionary cooperation in spatial social dilemmas, including prisoner's dilemma game and the snowdrift game with voluntary participation. In our model, a cooperative individual fitness will be redefined if one could obtain additional incentive bonus which is proportional to the number of cooperative neighbors. Moreover, each individual is a pure strategist in the spatial structured population and could only choose one of three strategies-cooperation, defection and being a loner. Through numerical simulations, we have confirmed that, compared with the traditional situation, reciprocal rewarding and the payoff of loner can significantly promote the cooperative behavior among the population, and the greater the contribution of reciprocal rewarding/payoff of loner, the more obvious the promoting effect on cooperation. In addition, we also find that there is a condition for loner to make the system fall into the three-strategy cyclic dominance, that is, the payoff of loner can not be too small or too large, which will destroy the situation of cyclic dominance. With regard to these results, it is strongly unveiled that reciprocal rewarding has a positive role to resolve the social dilemmas in the evolution of cooperation.

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Exploiting a cognitive bias promotes cooperation in social dilemma experiments

Cited by 232 publications

References 40 publications

Public Goods Games on Coevolving Social Network Models

Public Goods Games on Coevolving Social Network Models

Social and juristic challenges of artificial intelligence

Effects of Reciprocal Rewarding on the Evolution of Cooperation in Voluntary Social Dilemmas

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