Fairness in Long-Term Participatory Budgeting

Lackner, Martin; Maly, Jan; Rey, Simon

doi:10.24963/ijcai.2021/42

Cited by 10 publications

(12 citation statements)

References 4 publications

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Order By: Relevance

“…◮ Share (Lackner, Maly and Rey, 2021): measures the resources the decision maker used to satisfy the voters:…”

Section: Approval Ballotsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Lackner, Maly and Rey (2021) proposed the notion of relative satisfaction, which normalises the satisfaction of a voter by the maximum satisfaction achievable:…”

Section: Approval Ballotsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…where sat is any satisfaction function. Lackner, Maly and Rey (2021) only considered relative satisfaction associated with the cost satisfaction function sat cost . is can also not be modelled as an approval-based satisfaction function, as it depends on the full approval ballot of the voter.…”

Section: Approval Ballotsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Based on the observation that no satisfaction function can ever be satisfactory, Maly, Rey, Endriss and Lackner (2023) suggest to define fairness criteria not in terms of satisfaction but in terms of the resources spent on an agent, the so called equality of resources. ey use the concept of share (Lackner, Maly and Rey, 2021) to measure the amount of resources spent on an agent and aim at providing every agents with their fair share.…”

Section: Equality Of Resourcesmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…In their work, Lackner, Maly and Rey (2021) introduce what they call a fairness theory for long-term PB. ey assume that agents are partitioned into types and they try to achieve fairness for the types over time.…”

Section: Temporal Aspects Of Pbmentioning

confidence: 99%

See 4 more Smart Citations

The (Computational) Social Choice Take on Indivisible Participatory Budgeting

Rey¹,

Malý²

2023

Preprint

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

In this survey, we review the literature investigating participatory budgeting as a social choice problem. Participatory Budgeting (PB) is a democratic tool aiming at making budgeting decisions in a more democratic manner. Specifically, citizens are asked to vote on who to allocate a given amount of money to a set of projects that can potentially be funded. From a social choice perspective, it corresponds then to the problem of aggregating opinions about which projects should be funded, into a budget allocation satisfying a budget constraint. is problem has received substantial a ention in recent years and the literature is growing at a fast pace. In this survey, we present the most important research directions from the literature, each time presenting a large set of representative results. We only focus on the indivisible case, that is, PB problems in which projects can either be fully funded or not at all. e aim of the survey is to present a comprehensive overview of the state of the research on PB. We aim at providing both a general overview of the main research questions that are being investigated, and formal and unified definitions of the most important technical concepts from the literature.Of course a survey is never complete as the state of the research keeps changing. is document is intended to be a living document that gets updated every now and then as the literature grows. If you feel that some papers are not presented correctly, or simply missing, feel free to contact us. We will be more than happy to correct it.⋆ Laruelle (2021) considers that the agents submit weak and complete rankings over the projects, that are then converted into cardinal scores (via positional scoring functions) for the aggregation.

show abstract

“…◮ Share (Lackner, Maly and Rey, 2021): measures the resources the decision maker used to satisfy the voters:…”

Section: Approval Ballotsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Lackner, Maly and Rey (2021) proposed the notion of relative satisfaction, which normalises the satisfaction of a voter by the maximum satisfaction achievable:…”

Section: Approval Ballotsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Approval Ballotsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Equality Of Resourcesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Temporal Aspects Of Pbmentioning

confidence: 99%

See 3 more Smart Citations

The (Computational) Social Choice Take on Indivisible Participatory Budgeting

Rey¹,

Malý²

2023

Preprint

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

Fairness in Temporal Slot Assignment

Elkind

Kraiczy

Teh

2022

Algorithmic Game Theory

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Participatory Budgeting with Multiple Resources

Motamed

Soeteman

Rey

et al. 2022

Multi-Agent Systems

Self Cite

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

We put forward a formal model of participatory budgeting where projects can incur costs with respect to several different resources, such as money, energy, or emission allowances. We generalise several wellknown mechanisms from the usual single-resource setting to this multiresource setting and analyse their algorithmic efficiency, the extent to which they are immune to strategic manipulation, and the degree of proportional representation they can guarantee. We also prove a general impossibility theorem establishing the incompatibility of proportionality and strategyproofness for this model.

show abstract

Fairness in Long-Term Participatory Budgeting

Cited by 10 publications

References 4 publications

The (Computational) Social Choice Take on Indivisible Participatory Budgeting

The (Computational) Social Choice Take on Indivisible Participatory Budgeting

Fairness in Temporal Slot Assignment

Participatory Budgeting with Multiple Resources

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About