Fault detection, isolation and recovery (FDIR) in satellite onboard software

Abstract

Abstract-The complexity of the avionic systems in satellites is rising as space missions become increasingly more sophisticated. This complexity emphasizes the need for more dependable systems with minimal anomalies. As satellite manufactures seek to convert many hardware implemented functionalities into software, the On-Board Software (OBSW) is becoming a major component in every satellite. Noticeably, more tasks for Fault Detection, Isolation and Recovery (FDIR) are being implemented in software, where the need comes for a well-defined software architecture that supports a cost-effective implementation of the FDIR functions. FDIR was already explained as key functionality of the OBSW. Obviously not all failures are subject to onboard identification and not all failures are subject to onboard recovery. The FDIR concept to be worked out for the spacecraft during the engineering phase follows some basic requirements and principles, implements a certain failure hierarchy-specifying furthermore on which level the failure is to be fixed-and finally it implements a consistent approach for the functionality transferring the spacecraft to Safe Mode and how to recover from there. Since a FDIR concept usually follows a hierarchical approach, in this paper we will indicate a FDIR and safeguarding hierarchy example in the paper. In this structure we will indicate the levels of failures which handled by unit internal, subsystem software, satellite system software, onboard computer hardware reconfiguration unit and ground. Also we will explain the FDIR hierarchy in safe mode implementation in a bit more detail. In this paper we will consider FDIR technologies in the On-board software in a satellite. Today, there are several proposed methodologies and frameworks which try to solve this problem. We will analyze the functionalities in FDIR Module implemented in an OBSW Framework. Also we have a survey on the FDIR hierarchies and their relationship to the Packet Utilization Standard (PUS) Services.

A critical review on the state-of-the-art and future prospects of machine learning for Earth observation operations

“…Classical approaches FDIR in past missions worked under the notion that a fault is detected and then the algorithm will react, according to predefined scenarios. (Jalilian et al, 2017;Olive, 2010). Regarding ML-based models, one of the bottlenecks to having an on-board failure avoidance system is that the models are trained on the ground with limited data that does not represent actual behavior in space.…”

Risk Assessment for the Use of COTS Devices in Space Systems under Consideration of Radiation Effects

“…The FDIR (fault detection, isolation and recovery) concept is an important cornerstone of the failure tolerance design within a spacecraft. It is one of the key functionalities of the on-board software and relies mostly on a failure hierarchy provided by the FMECA that specifies on which level failures are to be fixed [6,7].…”

“…This is especially problematic because of the growing importance of SEE analyses for spacecraft. In many cases, it is neither affordable nor possible to develop SEE-immune hardware [6]. To respond to this situation, Gates et al [6] developed an approach tailored for the analysis of SEEs and their propagation-the so-called single-event effect criticality analysis (SEECA).…”

“…In many cases, it is neither affordable nor possible to develop SEE-immune hardware [6]. To respond to this situation, Gates et al [6] developed an approach tailored for the analysis of SEEs and their propagation-the so-called single-event effect criticality analysis (SEECA). The SEECA is a system engineering approach, which combines the analytical approach of dependability analysis (like FMECA) with the special knowledge needed to cope with SEE.…”