German Arms Exports: Between Normative Aspirations and Political Reality

Abstract

Deciding on arms exports is a delicate matter in western democracies. Potential economic and security gains have to be weighed against normative and security concerns. This article explores how this tension is solved in Germany, a country that holds strong moral aspirations but at the same time lists among the top arms exporting nations worldwide. Using a newly compiled dataset, we quantitatively analyse German exports of major conventional weapons (MCWs) from 1992 to 2013. Our statistical findings do not support the claim that the human rights situation in recipient countries plays an important role for German arms export decisions. Our two-stage model therefore supports a trading state rather than civilian power reading of Germany, at least when it comes to arms export practices.

Decision-Making in the Arms of a Dependent Relationship: Explaining Shifts in Importer Acquisition Patterns of Major Weapon Systems, 1955–2007

“…While extensive literature examines the supply and demand motivations for arms transfers (e.g. Blanton 1999Blanton , 2005Erickson 2011Erickson , 2015Johnson and Willardson 2018;Kinsella 1994Kinsella , 2002Moore 2012;Platte and Leuffen 2016), the decision to change suppliers is often overlooked. The decision to produce arms is studied (e.g.…”

“…Blanton 2005;Erickson 2011). Even Germany, an industrial supplier with domestic and constitutional law restricting arms exports (Johnson and Willardson 2018), transfer arms to human rights violators (Platte and Leuffen 2016). The dependency threat importers face from industrial suppliers is low, if not nonexistent.…”

Human Rights and Democratic Arms Transfers: Rhetoric Versus Reality with Different Types of Major Weapon Systems

“…2 Erickson (2011) examines the transfer of major weapon systems by EU states between 1990 and 2004; she finds no evidence that these states engage in ethical arms transfer behavior. Platte and Leuffen (2016) examine German arms transfers in the post-Cold War period. They find that human rights violations increase the likelihood of a transfer and that the size of transfers is bigger for states with human rights abuses.…”

“…We choose to only examine whether major weapon systems are transferred. Previously, Blanton (2005) used a two-stage Heckman model, Erickson (2011) used an OLS, and Platte and Leuffen (2016) used two separate models looking at the probability of transfer (logit) and size of transfer (OLS). We justify only looking at the decision to transfer due to the complicated nature of accounting for legitimate need of a state for different types of weapons -rarely are one or two units transferred.…”

“…More recently, Platte and Leuffen (2016) find that reunified Germany is more likely to transfer major weapon systems -and in larger quantities -to states with greater human rights violations.…”