Governors and “Their” Deputies: New Legislative Principals in Mexico

Abstract

Many studies on legislatures around the world have not detected a regional voting dimension. Yet governors are often important political figures and can exert strong influence on state politicians. From an analysis of the Mexican legislature, I determine that governors hold important resources that ambitious politicians need in a system with no consecutive reelection. Mexican governors use their power over federal deputies to prod their agents, the caucus leaders, into working for their states' interests on fiscally relevant issues, especially the annual budget. On all other issues, the governors delegate their deputies' votes to the party's legislative leadership.

(Sub)national Principals, Legislative Agents

“…Candidate selection methods in Mexico are generally centralized in the hands of party elites (Freidenberg, 2010;Wuhs, 2006). Governors are also thought to exert influence over the candidate selection of co-partisans in the states (Langston, 2010), suggesting federal deputies from the same party as their state's governor may be more likely to obtain ballot access for a subnational elected office. Methods of selection are often negotiated between state and national party leaders, although national leaders can overrule state leaders.…”

“…Previous explanations that highlight gubernatorial influence in the candidate selection process are overstated (Cantú & Desposato, 2012;Langston, 2010;Rosas & Langston, 2011), suggesting at a minimum that multiple principals influence the candidate selection process. Previous explanations that highlight gubernatorial influence in the candidate selection process are overstated (Cantú & Desposato, 2012;Langston, 2010;Rosas & Langston, 2011), suggesting at a minimum that multiple principals influence the candidate selection process.…”

Incumbency and Distributive Politics: Intergovernmental Transfers in Mexico

“…She describes how the final negotiation over the annual spending bill is defined by the Budget Committee Chamber ( Comisión de Presupuesto y Cuenta Pública ) and how specific spending requests are received from state deputies (to be financed by additional federal transfers made available during the annual budget negotiations within the Chamber). “Supposedly, the distribution of … two transfers ( participaciones and aportaciones ) is controlled by a government formula, but in practice, individual accounts rise and fall over time in ways that cannot be explained by the formula” (Langston , p. 264).…”

El congreso y la política de gasto en Jalisco, 1990-2014

“…La mayoría de los estudios considera que la relación entre el Ejecutivo y el Legislativo es asimétrica, ya que los gobernadores tienen más poder tanto formal como informalmente (Alvarado, 1996;Gutiérrez, 2013;Hernández 2008;Langston, 2010;Merino, 2010;Pliego, 2012). En contraste, los congresos locales padecen una debilidad institucional y organizacional para incidir en la política pública (Balkin, 2004;Lujambio, 2004;Pérez, 2009;Puente, 2011).…”