Heidegger on Kant, Time and the ‘Form’ of Intentionality

Golob, Sacha

doi:10.1080/09608788.2012.692662

Cited by 13 publications

(7 citation statements)

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“…In this way, the focus shifts from truth to idealism. My own view is that Heidegger was a realist, and I think the exegetical situation is much more complex than Lafont recognises, partly because Heidegger, perhaps uniquely, also viewed Kant as a realist (Golob 2013). But again, this is not the place to debate those issues: one fundamental issue, as Blattner has stressed, is that the ambiguity between realism and idealism is present in the very definition of "being" used by Heidegger.…”

Section: Idealism and Beingmentioning

confidence: 94%

Was Heidegger a relativist?

Golob¹

2019

The Emergence of Relativism

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At first glance, it might seem that relativism was not a central issue for Heidegger. He was, of course, extremely familiar with the Husserlian and post-Kantian debates which linked relativism, logic and psychologism: these had been the focus of his 1914 dissertation, Die Lehre vom Urteil im Psychologismus. There he attacks psychologism in part by linking it to relativism as Husserl had done before him: the challenge, Heidegger suggests, is to move beyond this negative point and to articulate a positive story about judgmental content, one that respects the phenomenology of the act of judging in a way that Husserl's own theory allegedly does not (Ga21:107,111). i But whilst Heidegger presses the issues of judgment and content closely in his mature work, by the time we reach Sein und Zeit, there is little explicit treatment of relativism. At points, Heidegger uses it there simply as a byword for philosophical error: he is quick to insist that his views have nothing to do with "a crude relativizing" [schlechte Relativierung], he warns against readings of Dilthey as offering a "relativistic" Lebensphilosophie and he praises Yorck for seeing through "all 'groundless' relativisms" (SZ:22,399,401). Admittedly, he does state that "all truth is relative to Dasein's being", but, having clarified that this does not mean that truth is 'left to the subject's discretion', he promptly drops the term and does not take it up again (SZ:227). Similarly, in other works, both before and after SZ, relativism is directly treated only in marginal contexts. The 1921 lectures Phänomenologische Interpretationen zu Aristoteles, for example, warn against the "atrophy of relativism" when discussing the link between philosophy and the university (Ga61:69), whilst 1935's Die Frage nach dem Ding , perhaps the clearest treatment of the Galilean paradigm shift, uses "Relativismus" only once, in a dismissive survey of standard views on indexicals. As elsewhere, it is clear that Heidegger regards both the term, this "cheap label", and the typical reactions to it, as problematic (Ga41:28).

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Section: Idealism and Beingmentioning

confidence: 94%

Was Heidegger a relativist?

Golob¹

2019

The Emergence of Relativism

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“…2 Kaip nurodo Sacha Golobas, Heideggeris 1927Heideggeris -1936 m. savo veikaluose skyrė apie 1000 puslapių Kanto filosofijos komentarams (Golob 2013). Arvydas šliogeris į lietuvių kalbą yra išvertęs ketvirtąją Heideggerio veikalo Kantas ir metafizikos problema (1929) dalį (žr.…”

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I. Kanto patyrimo teorijos metafizinė komunikacija: M. Heideggeris

Rimkus

2015

Coactivity: Philosophy, Communication

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2015 © Straipsnio autoriai. Leidėjas VGTU leidykla "Technika". šis straipsnis yra atvirosios prieigos straipsnis, turintis Kūrybinių bendrijų (Creative Commons) licenciją (CC BY-NC 4.0), kuri leidžia neribotą straipsnio ar jo dalių panaudą su privaloma sąlyga nurodyti autorių ir pirminį šaltinį. Straipsnis ar jo dalys negali būti naudojami komerciniams tikslams. 73CoaCtivity: Philosophy, Communication 2015, Vol. 23, No. 1, 73-85. ISSN 2029-6320/eISSN 2029 dėl istorinio nuotolio ir skirtingo nuo kantiš-kojo mūsų laikotarpio teorinio bei kultūrinio konteksto, bet ir sujungti į vientisą sistemą Kanto teorinės filosofijos elementus, o šiam sujungimui jo paties veikalai teikia skirtingų galimybių. Su tokiais keblumais neišvengiamai tenka susidurti nagrinėjant ir Kanto patyrimo teoriją, kuri yra glaudžiai susijusi su kantiškuoju metafizikos kaip mokslo galimybės klausimu, taip pat su Kanto požiūriais į transcendentinę metafiziką, teorinio ir praktinio proto santykį, Reikšminiai žodžiai: apriorizmas, daiktas savaime, metafizinis nominalizmas, metafizinis realizmas, patyrimas, ontologija, transcendentalinė sąmonė.

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“…Heidegger's reading of Kant is enormously complex. For a discussion focusing on the issue mentioned, see Golob (Forthcoming). For a contained example of the type of argument which Heidegger employs to illustrate the supposedly non‐propositional representation of Kantian substances, see Ga3:107.…”

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confidence: 99%

“…concepts—which is found in propositions: this mechanism is what Heidegger calls ‘horizonal’ or ‘schematic’ intentionality. For some details on this proposal in a historical context, see Golob (Forthcoming).…”

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confidence: 99%

Heidegger on Assertion, Method and Metaphysics

Golob

2013

European J of Philosophy

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In Sein und Zeit Heidegger makes several claims about the nature of ‘assertion’ [Aussage]. These claims are of particular philosophical interest: they illustrate, for example, important points of contact and divergence between Heidegger's work and philosophical movements including Kantianism, the early Analytic tradition and contemporary pragmatism. This article provides a new assessment of one of these claims: that assertion is connected to a ‘present‐at‐hand’ ontology. I also indicate how my analysis sets the stage for a new reading of Heidegger's further claim that assertion is an explanatorily derivative phenomenon. I begin with a loose overview of Heidegger's position and then develop a sharper formulation of the key premises. I go on to argue that existing treatments of the supposed link between assertion and the ‘present‐at‐hand’ are unsatisfactory, and advance a new, ‘methodological’, interpretation of that link. Finally, I sketch the implications of my interpretation for the further claim that assertion is explanatorily derivative.

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Heidegger on Kant, Time and the ‘Form’ of Intentionality

Cited by 13 publications

References 10 publications

Was Heidegger a relativist?

Was Heidegger a relativist?

I. Kanto patyrimo teorijos metafizinė komunikacija: M. Heideggeris

Heidegger on Assertion, Method and Metaphysics

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