Gauweiler and the Outright Monetary Transactions Programme: The Mandate of the European Central Bank and the Changing Nature of Economic and Monetary Union

Abstract

On 16 June 2015 the European Court of Justice delivered its decision in the Gauweiler case, 1 concerning the legality of the Outright Monetary Transactions Programme of the European Central Bank. The Court considered the Programme compatible with EU law, as long as certain safeguards are observed in its implementation. The decision has important implications for the powers of the European Central Bank, the constitutional framework of the EU's Economic and Monetary Union, and for the relationship between the Court of Justice of the EU and the referring court, the German Federal Constitutional Court. This was the first time that the German court had asked for a preliminary ruling, 2 and it remains to be seen whether the national

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