2010
DOI: 10.1080/10168737.2010.525994
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Income Tax Evasion in a Society of Heterogeneous Agents – Evidence from an Agent-based Model

Abstract: Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden. Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen. Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz … Show more

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Cited by 60 publications
(56 citation statements)
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“…Since then, other authors have taken similar approaches. For example, a set of distinct types is exogenously assumed to exist, see for instance Hokamp and Pickhardt (2010), who also have agents making random errors in their reported income, and Antunes et al (2007) who consider different bounded rational agents. Davis et al (2003) analyze a model with honest and susceptible agents together with evaders and show that if an initially compliant population shifts to evasion, it is difficult to reverse the situation and the number of audits must be increased beyond the level that would have achieved acceptable compliance in the first place.…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Since then, other authors have taken similar approaches. For example, a set of distinct types is exogenously assumed to exist, see for instance Hokamp and Pickhardt (2010), who also have agents making random errors in their reported income, and Antunes et al (2007) who consider different bounded rational agents. Davis et al (2003) analyze a model with honest and susceptible agents together with evaders and show that if an initially compliant population shifts to evasion, it is difficult to reverse the situation and the number of audits must be increased beyond the level that would have achieved acceptable compliance in the first place.…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Cyclical behavior in compliance is seen here when the audit probability is adjusted, but no guidance is provided on how to increase compliance. In addition, attempts have been made to investigate how psychological motives vary with different audit techniques (Davis et al 2003;Hokamp and Pickhardt 2010;Hokamp and Seibold 2014;Pickhardt and Prinz 2014). Econophysics models from statistical mechanics have also been considered, e.g.…”
Section: Tax Evasion Modelingmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Recent years have seen the introduction of computational methods like agent based modeling to the problem domain; these methods go beyond standard microeconomic models by treating individual taxpayers as discrete interacting entities embedded in complex social networks (Bloomquist 2006). Some notable examples of this kind of work include studies of changes in taxpayer reporting behavior under different audit scenarios (Hokamp and Pickhardt 2010), investigations of the impact of taxpayer network structures on tax compliance (Andrei et al 2013) and the identification of critical audit rates at which whole populations suddenly shift their equilibrium level of compliance (Davis et al 2003). In the present study, we propose an alternative formulation of the problem that treats tax evasion schemes, rather than individual taxpayers, as the fundamental objects of interest.…”
Section: Background and Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%