Industrial Control System (ICS) Cyber Security for Water and Wastewater Systems

Weiss, Joseph M.

doi:10.1007/978-3-319-01092-2_3

Cited by 31 publications

(30 citation statements)

References 0 publications

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Order By: Relevance

“…Increasingly, however, SCADA and business networks of most medium-to large-scale PWSs are inter-connected to provide integrated operation. If such integration is not secured, it will generally lead to greater vulnerability; this is very important to the water sector because it is thought to lag behind most other CIs in securing its control systems (Baker et al 2010;Weiss 2014). The top five areas of common security gaps in water supply are: (1) network configurations, (2) media protection, (3) remote access, (4) documented policies and procedures, and (5) trained staff.…”

Section: Common Vulnerabilities In the Water Supply Industrymentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Cyber-impacts may also have process impacts depending on the process and system design. For instance, if attackers change database parameters in the real-time database (impacts system integrity), they could turn on pumps potentially causing a tank to overflow as illustrated by the successful attack against the wastewater treatment plant in the Maroochy Shire in Queensland, Australia (Panguluri et al 2004;Janke et al 2014;Weiss 2014).…”

Section: Common Vulnerabilities In the Water Supply Industrymentioning

confidence: 99%

See 1 more Smart Citation

Protecting water and wastewater utilities from cyber‐physical threats

Clark¹,

Hakim

Panguluri³

2018

Water & Environment J

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Recent events have highlighted the need to address cybersecurity threats to systems supporting critical infrastructure and federal information systems which are evolving and growing. These threats have become ubiquitous in the United States, and throughout the world. Many information and communications technology (ICT) devices and other components are interdependent so that disruption of one component may have a negative, cascading effect on others. In the United States, the Federal role in cyber‐security has been debated for more than a decade but creating a policy is complicated because in the United States, State and local governments are the major institutions responsible for providing services to their populations. It is important that critical infrastructure such as Publically Owned Treatment Works (POTWs) and Public Water Systems (PWSs) adopt suitable countermeasures to prevent or minimise the consequences of cyber‐attacks. This paper discusses both technological and procedural techniques that can be used to protect against cyber‐threats.

show abstract

Section: Common Vulnerabilities In the Water Supply Industrymentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Common Vulnerabilities In the Water Supply Industrymentioning

confidence: 99%

Protecting water and wastewater utilities from cyber‐physical threats

Clark¹,

Hakim

Panguluri³

2018

Water & Environment J

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…In case of ICS, social impact due to threats and vulnerabilities like hacking, natural disaster, and internal problems for system cannot compare with general information systems and has great damage that brings out severe economic and social dislocation [5].…”

Section: Safety Risk Analysis Of Power Icsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Study of Security Protection on Power Industrial Control System

Li¹,

Wang²,

Li³

et al. 2017

dtcse

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

“…Many ICSs and devices are connected to the Internet [Andreeva, Gordeychik, Gritsai et al (2016)] and show an increasing trend year over year [Xu, Tao and Guan (2018)]. Because ICSs are different from traditional IT systems [Stouffer, Falco and Scarfone (2011)], traditional security solutions cannot completely solve ICS security problems [Weiss (2008)]. In addition, ICSs control the actual physical process.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

MSICST: Multiple-Scenario Industrial Control System Testbed for Security Research

Xu¹,

Tao²,

Yang³

et al. 2019

Computers, Materials &Amp; Continua

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

A security testbed is an important aspect of Industrial Control System (ICS) security research. However, existing testbeds still have many problems in that they cannot fully simulate enterprise networks and ICS attacks. This paper presents a Multiple-Scenario Industrial Control System Testbed (MSICST), a hardware-in-the-loop ICS testbed for security research. The testbed contains four typical process scenarios: thermal power plant, rail transit, smart grid, and intelligent manufacturing. We use a combination of actual physical equipment and software simulations to build the process scenario sand table and use real hardware and software to build the control systems, demilitarized zone, and enterprise zone networks. According to the ICS cyber kill chain, the attacker is modeled, and two typical attack scenarios are constructed in the testbed. Through research into this security solution, whitelist-based host protection and a new Intrusion Detection System (IDS) are proposed and tested.

show abstract

Industrial Control System (ICS) Cyber Security for Water and Wastewater Systems

Cited by 31 publications

References 0 publications

Protecting water and wastewater utilities from cyber‐physical threats

Protecting water and wastewater utilities from cyber‐physical threats

Study of Security Protection on Power Industrial Control System

MSICST: Multiple-Scenario Industrial Control System Testbed for Security Research

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About