Information, competition, and the quality of charities

Krasteva, Silvana; Yıldırım, Hüseyin

doi:10.1016/j.jpubeco.2016.10.008

Cited by 39 publications

(13 citation statements)

References 27 publications

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“… Their donative behavior is thus the same as that of the purely mission‐oriented donors in Krasteva and Yildirim (). The other donors here could be viewed as needing a nudge in the form of persuasive advertising, face‐to‐face solicitation, etc., “asking” them to contribute.…”

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confidence: 71%

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Help not needed? Optimal host country regulation of expatriate NGO workers

Glazer

Hagen

Rattsø

2017

Rev International Economics

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Motivated by interventions in poor countries to increase the use of local labor in foreign nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), we address the behavior of these organizations under host government regulation. We extend existing NGO models by distinguishing between local workers and expatriates. The model covers both NGO monopoly and competition in the market for donations. Assuming that NGOs maximize output, we show that regulations in the form of a quota on the number of expatriates or a work permit fee for foreigners reduces NGO output, but increases employment of locals. The optimal quota is more likely to bind in the market structure generating the highest total fundraising surplus. An optimal work permit fee is equivalent to an optimal quota in both the monopoly and duopoly cases. For both instruments, the optimal tightness of regulation is decreasing in the weight the government attaches to the public good relative to domestic incomes and in the importance of NGO output to the supply of the public good. Aggregate NGO output and the level of the public good produced could be higher with a monopoly NGO.

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confidence: 71%

“…Krasteva and Yildirim () and Scharf () study competition between NGOs, but they focus on the implications for the quality of the organizations active in the sector, whereas we abstract from heterogeneity. Aldashev and Verdier () model fundraising by competing development NGOs, as we do.…”

Section: Motivation and Related Literaturementioning

confidence: 99%

Help not needed? Optimal host country regulation of expatriate NGO workers

Glazer

Hagen

Rattsø

2017

Rev International Economics

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“…Essa certificação, aparentemente, ainda gira em torno de um fator determinante e um fator consequente para a sua obtenção -o atendimento aos requisitos da Interpretação Técnica Geral (ITG) 2002 (CFC, 2012) e a contrapartida das imunidades tributárias, respectivamente (Beuren & Tamanini, 2009;Lima & Pereira, 2004). Contudo, trata-se de um segmento que envolve diversos stakeholders (Costa & Pesci, 2016;Grizzle & Sloan, 2016;Williams & Taylor, 2013), muita competição por recursos (Gordon, Knock, & Neely, 2009;Krasteva & Yildirim, 2016), pressões por desempenho, maior responsabilização pelos resultados (accountability) (Boateng, Akamavi, & Ndoro, 2016;Grieco, Michelini, & Iasevoli, 2015), além da assimetria da informação entre as OTS e os doadores de recursos (Gordon et al, 2009;Ortmann & Svítková, 2007;Weisbrod & Dominguez, 1986).…”

Section: Introductionunclassified

Antecedentes e consequentes do processo de obtenção e renovação do Certificado de Entidades Beneficentes de Assistência Social (Cebas)

Pinheiro

d’Angelo²

2021

REPeC

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Objetivo: Compreender de forma holística os antecedentes e consequentes do processo de obtenção e renovação do Certificado de Entidades Beneficentes de Assistência Social (CEBAS). Método: Pesquisa qualitativa-quantitativa com dados primários (questionário e entrevistas semiestruturadas) e secundários (documentos disponibilizados nos sites dos ministérios) analisados por meio da Templates Analysis e da estatística descritiva. Resultados: As evidências indicam seis antecedentes (evidenciação contábil, capacitação e profissionalização das organizações do terceiro setor (OTS) e dos contadores, auditoria externa, insegurança jurídica e outras situações) e quatro consequentes (imunidade tributária, credibilidade das OTS, captação de recursos e mudança cultural) da certificação CEBAS. Também indicam as vulnerabilidades controláveis e não controláveis nos antecedentes a serem enfrentadas pelos atores sociais envolvidos com esse processo. A imunidade tributária ainda é um dos principais consequentes desse processo, ou seja, algumas OTS não valorizam essa certificação para outros benefícios, como o aumento da credibilidade e, por conseguinte, aumento da captação de recursos. Contribuições: Para a contabilidade voltada à sustentabilidade, no tocante à formulação de políticas públicas para apoiar o fortalecimento da gestão das OTS. O estudo alerta para a perda de oportunidades de aumentar a quantidade de doadores, nos níveis individual e organizacional, expondo a miopia dessa certificação. Para ampliar a literatura sobre certificações ao propor um modelo conceitual para ser testado em futuras pesquisas quantitativas.

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“…Matches (if they signal quality) could lower the information acquisition cost for donors, and thus shift charitable giving towards more effective charities (e.g., see Krasteva and Yildirim, 2013 ). In a model endogenizing production of quality information, Krasteva and Yildirim (2016) also shows that lowering the cost of information for donors should raise the equilibrium number of quality nonprofits, although at an extreme, with too many donors only seeking the best charities, more quality information could have a deleterious effect on competition in the nonprofit sector.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

How can Bill and Melinda Gates increase other people's donations to fund public goods?

Karlan

List

2020

Journal of Public Economics

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We develop a simple theory which formally describes how charities can resolve the information asymmetry problems faced by small donors by working with large donors to generate quality signals. To test the model, we conducted two large-scale natural field experiments. In the first experiment, a charity focusing on poverty reduction solicited donations from prior donors and either announced a matching grant from the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation, or made no mention of a match. In the second field experiment, the same charity sent direct mail solicitations to individuals who had not previously donated to the charity, and tested whether naming the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation as the matching donor was more effective than not identifying the name of the matching donor. The first experiment demonstrates that the matching grant condition generates more and larger donations relative to no match. The second experiment shows that providing a credible quality signal by identifying the matching donor generates even more and larger donations than not naming the matching donor. Importantly, the treatment effects persist long after the matching period, and the quality signal is quite heterogeneous-the Gates' effect is much larger for prospective donors who had a record of giving to "poverty-oriented" charities. These two pieces of evidence support our model of quality signals as a key mechanism through which matching gifts inspire donors to give.

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Information, competition, and the quality of charities

Cited by 39 publications

References 27 publications

Help not needed? Optimal host country regulation of expatriate NGO workers

Help not needed? Optimal host country regulation of expatriate NGO workers

Antecedentes e consequentes do processo de obtenção e renovação do Certificado de Entidades Beneficentes de Assistência Social (Cebas)

How can Bill and Melinda Gates increase other people's donations to fund public goods?

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