Interplay between cost and effectiveness in influenza vaccine uptake: a vaccination game approach

Abstract

<jats:p>Pre-emptive vaccination is regarded as one of the most protective measures to control influenza outbreak. There are mainly two types of influenza viruses—influenza A and B with several subtypes—that are commonly found to circulate among humans. The traditional trivalent (TIV) flu vaccine targets two strains of influenza A and one strain of influenza B. The quadrivalent (QIV) vaccine targets one extra B virus strain that ensures better protection against influenza; however, the use of QIV vaccine can be costly, hence impose an extra financial burden to society. This scenario might create a dilemma in choosing vaccine types at the individual level. This article endeavours to explain such a dilemma through the framework of a vaccination game, where individuals can opt for one of the three options: choose either of QIV or TIV vaccine or none. Our approach presumes a mean-field framework of a vaccination game in an infinite and well-mixed population, entangling the disease spreading process of influenza with the coevolution of two types of vaccination decision-making processes taking place before an epidemic season. We conduct a series of numerical simulations as an attempt to illustrate different scenarios. The framework has been validated by the so-called multi-agent simulation (MAS) approach.</jats:p>

Optimal control and differential game solutions for social distancing in response to epidemics of infectious diseases on networks

“…Vaccination is considered as one of the most measures to control influenza outbreak. In 2019, Arefin et al 24 investigated two types of vaccines; The traditional trivalent (TIV) flu vaccine and the quadrivalent (QIV) vaccine. They showed that people can choose QIV or TIV vaccine or they select none.…”

Modeling the competitive diffusions of rumor and knowledge and the impacts on epidemic spreading

“…However, the world is still not fully prepared for the outbreak of an epidemic [8] . There are many reasons behind this, including the widespread presence of viral vectors (such as mosquitoes) [9] , virus mutation [10] , low effect of treatment [11] , [12] , seasonal outbreak (such as influenza) [13] , [14] , etc. As a consequence, the global protection is not enough, and people are usually encouraged to strengthen personal protection to reduce the risk of being infected, and they are also willing to do that [15] , [16] .…”

Strategy equilibrium in dilemma games with off-diagonal payoff perturbations

“…At the same time, group diversity can shield the possible flaws of individual members while sustaining the whole group in a synergetic manner. This rationale has been applied to economies, enterprise communities, vaccination models, and even in biological evolution [26,[28][29][30][31]. It also represents a fundamental aspect in genetic algorithms as well [32], whose core mechanism is based on a heterogeneous population of candidate solutions that evolve towards a (sub)optimal solution.…”