“It’s the politics, stupid!”. The politicization of anti-corruption in Italy

Sberna, Salvatore; Vannucci, Alberto

doi:10.1007/s10611-013-9480-8

Cited by 49 publications

(17 citation statements)

References 21 publications

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“…Também na busca por um maior equilíbrio, a Espanha, com um Judiciário mais independente, tem um Conselho composto, em sua maioria, por representantes do parlamento (Pessanha, 2014). Por outro lado, na Itália, como consequência do trauma do período fascista, a Constituição de 1948 insulou juízes e promotores das ingerências político-partidárias, o que se reflete também na composição do Conselho, formado exclusivamente por magistrados, sendo a independência a característica primordial (Guarnieri, 2015;Sberna & Vannucci, 2013).…”

Section: Conselhos De Sistemas De Justiçaunclassified

Os Conselhos Nacionais de Justiça e do Ministério Público no Brasil: instrumentos de accountability?

2020

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Resumo Em democracias, conselhos, órgãos colegiados atuantes no Sistema de Justiça possuem diferentes finalidades: reforçar a independência do Poder Judiciário e do Ministério Público (MP), incrementar a accountability em relação a juízes e promotores e/ou aprimorar a gestão da Justiça. Este artigo analisa o Conselho Nacional de Justiça (CNJ) e o Conselho Nacional do Ministério Público (CNMP), considerando principalmente os dois primeiros aspectos. No momento da criação desses órgãos, acreditava-se que ambos seriam instrumentos para aumentar a transparência e possibilitar que juízes e promotores pudessem responder por suas ações e escolhas. Nossa hipótese é que essa expectativa não se realizou. Para testá-la, analisaremos o desenho institucional do CNMP e do CNJ, apontando como a composição e a distribuição de cargos incentivam mais a independência que a accountability e apresentaremos também dados relativos ao comportamento dos Conselhos frente às denúncias disciplinares. A conclusão é que, em virtude da composição majoritária do CNJ e do CNMP por integrantes internos do Judiciário e do MP e da atuação pouco expressiva em relação à punição de juízes e promotores, os órgãos reforçam ainda mais a expressiva independência dessas instituições no Brasil.

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Section: Conselhos De Sistemas De Justiçaunclassified

Os Conselhos Nacionais de Justiça e do Ministério Público no Brasil: instrumentos de accountability?

2020

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“…The Operation started in February 1992, with the arrest of Mario Chiesa, politician member of the Italian Socialist Party, charged with taking kickbacks. Around one month later, isolated and without the support of his old political partners, Chiesa proposed to turn state's evidence (Vannucci, 2009;Sberna &Vannucci, 2013;Vannucci, 2016).…”

Section: The Italian Casementioning

confidence: 99%

“…When the arrests started, offenders agreed to turn state's evidence as well, weakening the Italian political and economic system. The loss of legitimacy of the systems increased the power of judicial action and, at the same time, was fed by the results of the investigations (Moro, 2004;Sberna &Vannucci, 2013;Vannucci, 2016).…”

Section: The Italian Casementioning

confidence: 99%

Limits of Brazilian public accounting and control systems to address the systemic corruption problem: lessons from the Swedish and Italian cases

Garcia

Teodósio

2020

Rev. Adm. Pública

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Th is article seeks to understand the reasons for the persistence of corruption in the Brazilian federal government, despite strong public accounting and fi nancial control systems in the country. More than two-thirds of the states in the world, including Brazil, face the challenge of plundering public fi nances by political, economic, and bureaucratic elites. In this context, the exclusive use of the dominant approach of economic theories for the structuring of public control systems is limited. It is more appropriate to consider corruption as a problem of collective action. Hence, the theoretical reference chosen includes Bourdieu's theory of practice and Tocqueville's and Ostrom's collective action theories, as they have been understood respectively by Mungiu-Pippidi and Rothstein. Th e methodological strategy adopted is an exploratory analysis of the cases of contemporary day Brazil, based on the lessons learned from nineteenth-century Sweden, and Italy in the 1990s. Th e results indicated that overcoming systemic corruption requires more than control systems. It demands, at least, a trigger to disrupt the perverse social imbalance, institutional capacity to off er normative eff ectiveness and a cohesive and active civil society.Análise de limites dos sistemas de contabilidade e controle para o enfretamento do problema da corrupção sistêmica no Brasil: lições dos casos da Suécia e da Itália.JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION | Rio de Janeiro 54(1):79-98, Jan. -Feb. 2020 RAP | Limits of Brazilian public accounting and control systems to address the systemic corruption problem: lessons from the Swedish and Italian cases 80 ser más apropiado buscar soluciones derivadas del enfoque de las teorías de acción colectiva. Él utiliza la teoría de la práctica de Bourdieu y las teorías de la acción colectiva de Tocqueville y Ostrom, conforme adoptadas por Mungiu-Pippidi y Rothstein, respectivamente. La estrategia metodológica es un análisis exploratorio del caso brasileño, a la luz de las lecciones de Suecia en el siglo XIX, e Italia en la década de 1990. Los resultados indican que superar la corrupción sistémica puede requerir más que establecer sistemas de contabilidad y de control fuerte. Es necesario, por lo mínimo, un gatillo que desestabilice el equilibrio social perverso existente, cierta capacidad institucional para conferir efectividad normativa y una sociedad civil activa y cohesiva.

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“…Similarly, Ecker et al (2016) showed that corruption damages parties and candidates only when the media give wide coverage of the scandals, or when corruption is a salient issue in the electoral arena. Finally, the politicization of the debate on corruption may discredit judicial activity, thus biasing the perceptions of partisan voters and reducing the effects of scandals on electoral choices (Anduiza et al, 2013; Eggers, 2014; Sberna and Vannucci, 2013).…”

Section: Electoral Accountability and Political Corruptionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Italian party leaders have often defended their politicians involved in scandals, underlining the political bias of judicial activity (Ceron and Mainenti, 2015). Indeed, they have not kept anti-corruption inquiries out of the debate, but they have strategically questioned their impartiality, reducing the overall risk of electoral sanctioning (Sberna and Vannucci, 2013: 590). For instance, Silvio Berlusconi, leader of the main centre-right party, has repeatedly argued that left-wing judges ‘carried out political activity in the form of investigations, trials, sentences’ (Edwards, 2005: 27) and used ‘judicial mechanisms to eliminate their political opponents, treading on the law, judicial procedure and reality with false inquiries, inventing witnesses, contradictory accusations, show-trials and hideous sentences’ (Sberna and Vannucci, 2013: 588).…”

Section: Corruption Charges In Italy: Data and Variablesmentioning

confidence: 99%

When rotten apples spoil the ballot: The conditional effect of corruption charges on parties’ vote shares

Cerón

Mainenti

2016

International Political Science Review

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The impact of corruption charges on the electoral performance of parties is conditioned by specific institutional factors. This article shows the extent to which the effects of political corruption depend on the control that party leaders exercise over the ballot. It is argued that voters might abstain or support other lists if they cannot select individual candidates to revitalize the reputation of the political party. Employing data on judicial investigations in Italy from 1983 to 2013, we provide evidence of the role of electoral rules and intra-party xcandidate selection in shaping the relationship between corruption and voters’ behaviour. Parties implicated in corruption or related crimes experience a loss of votes when they compete under a closed list formula or when the candidate selection process is strongly centralized.

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“It’s the politics, stupid!”. The politicization of anti-corruption in Italy

Cited by 49 publications

References 21 publications

Os Conselhos Nacionais de Justiça e do Ministério Público no Brasil: instrumentos de accountability?

Os Conselhos Nacionais de Justiça e do Ministério Público no Brasil: instrumentos de accountability?

Limits of Brazilian public accounting and control systems to address the systemic corruption problem: lessons from the Swedish and Italian cases

When rotten apples spoil the ballot: The conditional effect of corruption charges on parties’ vote shares

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