Judgements of Deontic Relevance in Reasoning: A Reply to Jackson and Griggs

Girotto, Vittorio; Mazzocco, Alberto; Cherubini, Paolo

doi:10.1080/14640749208401333

Cited by 27 publications

(12 citation statements)

References 24 publications

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“…In addition, Kroger, Cheng and Holyoak (1993) reported experiments conducted to reconcile findings reported as inconsistent with the pragmatic reasoning schema theory (see, for example, Jackson and Griggs, 1990). They suggested that the results reported by Jackson and Griggs (1990) are explained by pragmatic reasoning schemas, and their results complement findings of content effects reported by Girotto, Mazzocco and Cherubini (1992), again consistent with selective evocation of reasoning schemas.…”

supporting

confidence: 61%

Facilitating Performance with Cued Wording: An Examination of Reasoning in the Tax Context

Rupert

Wartick

1997

Appl. Cognit. Psychol.

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Researchers have consistently found increased accuracy for reasoning tasks that involve permission and obligation situations; however, little is known about the task characteristics that aid the reasoning processes in these situations. This study investigates the ability of cued wording (i.e., ‘is permitted’ or ‘is required’) to increase the accuracy of subjects' reasoning. Specifically, two experiments were conducted using versions of the Wason selection task to present tax rules involving permission and obligation situations. Results of both experiments generally support the use of cued wording to increase reasoning accuracy, especially for those subjects with no experience with the rule. These results have implications for rule‐driven fields like taxation, where taxpayers must comply with numerous provisions containing permission and obligation situations. © 1997 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

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supporting

confidence: 61%

Facilitating Performance with Cued Wording: An Examination of Reasoning in the Tax Context

Rupert

Wartick

1997

Appl. Cognit. Psychol.

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“…Most recent work on the selection task has concentrated on how thematic content affects reasoning (e.g., Cheng & Holyoak, 1985Cosmides, 1989;Evans, 1989;Gigerenzer & Hug, 1992;Girotto, Mazzocco, & Cherubini, 1992;Griggs & Cox, 1982;Jackson & Griggs, 1990;Johnson-Laird & Byrne, 1991Manktelow & Over, 1987, 1990a, 1990b, 1991Rumelhart, 1980). In the selection task, this work originated in the attempt to facilitate falsificatory reasoning (Johnson-Laird, Legrenzi, & Legrenzi, 1972;Wason & Shapiro, 1971).…”

Section: Thematic Selection Taskmentioning

confidence: 99%

A rational analysis of the selection task as optimal data selection.

Oaksford

Chater²

1994

Psychological Review

960

1,140

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Human reasoning in hypothesis-testing tasks like Wason's (1966, 1968) selection task has been depicted as prone to systematic biases. However, performance on this task has been assessed against a now outmoded falsificationist philosophy of science. Therefore, the experimental data is reassessed in the light of a Bayesian model of optimal data selection in inductive hypothesis testing. The model provides a rational analysis (Anderson, 1990) of the selection task that fits well with people's performance on both abstract and thematic versions of the task. The model suggests that reasoning in these tasks may be rational rather than subject to systematic bias. Over the past 30 years, results in the psychology of reasoning have raised doubts about human rationality. The assumption of human rationality has a long history. Aristotle took the capacity for rational thought to be the defining characteristic of human beings, the capacity that separated us from the animals. Descartes regarded the ability to use language and to reason as the hallmarks of the mental that separated it from the merely physical. Many contemporary philosophers of mind also appeal to a basic principle of rationality in accounting for everyday, folk psychological explanation whereby we explain each other's behavior in terms of our beliefs and desires (

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“…An 'only if' assertion seems to work best when its second component (B) precedes in time its first component (A) (Cheng & Holyoak, 1985;Evans & Beck, 1981;Ormerod, Manktelow, & Jones, 1993;Rips & Marcus, 1977;Thompson & Mann, 1995). 'Only if' often contains a precondition in its consequent, for example, 'you can go out to play only if you tidy your room' (Girotto, Mazzocco, & Cherubini, 1992).…”

Section: Indicative and Counterfactual 'Only If'mentioning

confidence: 99%