Laboratory biosafety for handling emerging viruses

Artika, I Made; Ma’roef, Chairin Nisa

doi:10.1016/j.apjtb.2017.01.020

Cited by 39 publications

(36 citation statements)

References 64 publications

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“…In order to minimize viral exposure which may cause viral infections to laboratory workers, adherence to recommended biosafety guidelines during diagnostic testing of pathogenic viruses is critical (Artika and Ma'roef, 2017). For example, all work with infectious Ebola viruses should be performed within a BSL4 facility (Ro et al, 2017).…”

Section: Polymerase Chain Reactionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Any procedure that may generate aerosols or droplets should be performed in a biological safety cabinet (World Health Organization (WHO), 2005). Avian influenza A virus propagation must be carried out in a BSL3 facility (Artika and Ma'roef, 2017). For SARS, testing of respiratory or stool specimens must be done at least using BSL2 level precautions in a class II biological safety cabinet.…”

Section: Polymerase Chain Reactionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…These risks can be minimized through the application of biosafety principles and practices. The activities need to be performed within a biocontainment environment using appropriate equipment and personal protective equipment (Artika and Ma'roef, 2017). A diagnostic virology laboratory must be set up to meet biosafety level 2 (BSL2) standards or above.…”

Section: Development Of Laboratory Capacitymentioning

confidence: 99%

See 2 more Smart Citations

Pathogenic viruses: Molecular detection and characterization

Artika

Wiyatno

Ma’roef

2020

Infection, Genetics and Evolution

Self Cite

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Section: Polymerase Chain Reactionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Polymerase Chain Reactionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Development Of Laboratory Capacitymentioning

confidence: 99%

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Pathogenic viruses: Molecular detection and characterization

Artika

Wiyatno

Ma’roef

2020

Infection, Genetics and Evolution

Self Cite

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“…Despite all the efforts made in preventing them, such incidents and accidents like spills, misuse of infectious materials, exposure of laboratory staff or accidental release of biological agents may occur. While the occurrence of incidences cannot be totally prevented, their handling should definitely avoid negative consequences [23]. In order to enhance the capabilities in handling incidents.…”

Section: Normalization Of Incident Handling Proceduresmentioning

confidence: 99%

SINS model in the management of biosafety level 2 laboratories: exploration and practice

Qiu¹,

Weng²,

Jiang³

et al. 2019

Biosafety and Health

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A significant number of biosafety level 2 (BSL-2) laboratories have been established in many countries for studies of various types of pathogenic agents and other infectious biological materials. The harmonized management of biological risks in such diverse laboratories thus appears as a real challenge. Zhejiang Province in China has taken the initiative to establish a comprehensively integrated laboratory biosafety management system called SINS (Standardization, Informatization, Normalization and Systematization). The SINS model system has been introduced and adopted in 1,721 BSL-2 laboratories in Zhejiang Province, and thus lead to an increase in the number of biosafety committees from 20% to more than 95% from 2007 to 2018, and the number of biosafety laboratory managers who knows biosafety-related laws and regulations increase from 52.7% to 83.7% from 2009 to 2017. Such achievements indicate that the successful implementation of SINS model has increased the effective control of biological risks in BSL-2 laboratories of the Zhejiang Province. SINS model and its main effects on leading the improvement of laboratory biosafety management was presented in this review. The SINS model helps to strengthen laboratory biosafety and thus effectively reduces occurrence of biosafety-related incidences. This model can potentially be used by other regions or countries where harmonized biosafety management system is still under-developing.

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“…This will provide a foundation to develop strategies to detect, prevent and treat the diseases caused, whether they emerge naturally or as a result of bioterrorism. It is worthy to note, that working on these viruses is challenging as the viruses used as biothreat agents are dangerous making the need for the research activity to be performed at high and maximum levels of biocontainment (biosafety level 3 and 4) (Tree et al, 2015;Artika and Ma'roef, 2017). The unpredictability of future emergence and re-emergence of pathogenic viruses which pose biothreats demands development of local capacity to rapidly detect and characterize circulating pathogenic viruses (Ma et al, 2011;Agustiningsih et al, 2016;Wiyatno et al, 2016).…”

Section: Laboratory Biosecurity Risk Managementmentioning

confidence: 99%