Manufacturer’s return policy in a two-stage supply chain with two risk-averse retailers and random demand

Hsieh, Chung-Chi; Yu, Lu

doi:10.1016/j.ejor.2010.04.026

Cited by 89 publications

(45 citation statements)

References 27 publications

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“…As the complicated closed-form results for the general case are difficult to show, a numerical evaluation is used to provide the answer to the question. This approach has been applied by several authors (e.g., see: Bichescu and Fry 2009;Yu et al 2009;Hsieh and Lu 2010;Hua et al 2010;Dan et al 2012;Li et al 2015).…”

Section: Comparisons In the General Casementioning

confidence: 97%

Pricing Decisions in Dual-Channel Supply Chain Including Monopolistic Manufacturer and Duopolistic Retailers: A Game-Theoretic Approach

2016

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Emergence of the Internet as a new distribution channel has led to increasing attention by researchers to dual-channel supply chain in recent years. In this paper, pricing and ordering decisions are investigated on a dual-channel supply chain which consists of monopolistic manufacturer and duopolistic retailers. The market is assumed to be controlled by the manufacturer. Thus, the manufacturer becomes leader and the two retailers act as followers. Due to establishing this new structure, different game-theoretic models including Bertrand, Collusion, and Stackelberg are developed to analyze pricing strategies under the various interactions between the two retailers. Then, the equilibrium decisions are compared under the considered scenarios and valuable managerial insights are presented. We found that the various games do not have any effects on the manufacturer's responses. The retail prices given by the Collusion game are higher than by the other games. In the Collusion model, demands in the retail channel are lower than in the other games. Moreover, the manufacturer and retailers receive respectively the lowest and the highest profits under the Collusion game.

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Section: Comparisons In the General Casementioning

confidence: 97%

Pricing Decisions in Dual-Channel Supply Chain Including Monopolistic Manufacturer and Duopolistic Retailers: A Game-Theoretic Approach

2016

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“…Yu, Zhu, and Wang (2013) obtained optimal price and order quantity of a newsvendor model with fuzzy price-dependent demand so that the expected profit could be maximised. In this direction, Johansen and Thorstenson (1993), Chou andChung (2009), Chen andChuang (2000), Wang (2010) and Hsieh and Lu (2010) have developed different types of production-inventory models for uncertain demand, among others. This paper addresses a production-inventory model for a two-stage supply chain while demand of the end customers is dependent on random factor and sales teams' initiatives/promotional effort, considering varying procurement cost, sharing of the cost invested in sales teams' initiatives/promotional effort by both members of the chain, unlike the features of the existing literature.…”

Section: Brief Review Of the Literaturementioning

confidence: 99%

Optimal production lot size and reorder point of a two-stage supply chain while random demand is sensitive with sales teams' initiatives

Sana¹

2014

International Journal of Systems Science

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The paper develops a production-inventory model of a two-stage supply chain consisting of one manufacturer and one retailer to study production lot size/order quantity, reorder point sales teams' initiatives where demand of the end customers is dependent on random variable and sales teams' initiatives simultaneously. The manufacturer produces the order quantity of the retailer at one lot in which the procurement cost per unit quantity follows a realistic convex function of production lot size. In the chain, the cost of sales team's initiatives/promotion efforts and wholesale price of the manufacturer are negotiated at the points such that their optimum profits reached nearer to their target profits. This study suggests to the management of firms to determine the optimal order quantity/production quantity, reorder point and sales teams' initiatives/promotional effort in order to achieve their maximum profits. An analytical method is applied to determine the optimal values of the decision variables. Finally, numerical examples with its graphical presentation and sensitivity analysis of the key parameters are presented to illustrate more insights of the model.

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“…Cheng, Wan, and Wang (2009) introduced a bilevel model for the two-stage supply chain with CVaR measure is considered as the objective of retailer. Hsieh and Lu (2010) characterized the retailer's risk-embedded objective via CVaR and studied return policy of the manufacture and decision of the retailer in the two-stage supply chain. Caliskan-Demirag, Chen, and Li (2011) analyzed a manufacture's customer and retailer rebates in the context of modeling aversion by adopting CVaR measure for the two-stage supply chain.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

A tri-level programming model based on Conditional Value-at-Risk for three-stage supply chain management

Meng

Shen

2013

Computers & Industrial Engineering

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Manufacturer’s return policy in a two-stage supply chain with two risk-averse retailers and random demand

Cited by 89 publications

References 27 publications

Pricing Decisions in Dual-Channel Supply Chain Including Monopolistic Manufacturer and Duopolistic Retailers: A Game-Theoretic Approach

Pricing Decisions in Dual-Channel Supply Chain Including Monopolistic Manufacturer and Duopolistic Retailers: A Game-Theoretic Approach

Optimal production lot size and reorder point of a two-stage supply chain while random demand is sensitive with sales teams' initiatives

A tri-level programming model based on Conditional Value-at-Risk for three-stage supply chain management

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