2012
DOI: 10.1111/j.1460-2466.2012.01633.x
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Networked Authoritarianism and Social Media in Azerbaijan

Abstract: The diffusion of digital media does not always have democratic consequences. This mixedmethods study examines how the government of Azerbaijan dissuaded Internet users from political activism. We examine how digital media were used for networked authoritarianism, a form of Internet control common in former Soviet states where manipulation over digitally mediated social networks is used more than outright censorship. Through a content analysis of 3 years of Azerbaijani media, a 2-year structural equation model … Show more

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Cited by 141 publications
(77 citation statements)
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References 27 publications
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“…Google chairman Eric Schmidt worried as early as 2013 that Russia was beginning to copy China in internet censorship (Luhn, 2014), while SORM-3 and data localization requirements (including the LinkedIn ban) are further indications that the Kremlin is serious about controlling information within its borders. At the international level, Russia is normalizing and helping to spread networked authoritarianism through various strategies in internet governance fora, at the UN, and through the Shanghai Cooperation Organization "authoritarians' club" (see Pearce & Kendzior, 2012, for an examination of networked authoritarianism in Azerbaijan). At the same time, it has been waging a slow, covert campaign to dismantle the transatlantic alliance using "information weapons" honed in its near-abroad, most famously in Ukraine but also in Moldova.…”
Section: Analysis: Understanding Russia's Networked Authoritarianismmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Google chairman Eric Schmidt worried as early as 2013 that Russia was beginning to copy China in internet censorship (Luhn, 2014), while SORM-3 and data localization requirements (including the LinkedIn ban) are further indications that the Kremlin is serious about controlling information within its borders. At the international level, Russia is normalizing and helping to spread networked authoritarianism through various strategies in internet governance fora, at the UN, and through the Shanghai Cooperation Organization "authoritarians' club" (see Pearce & Kendzior, 2012, for an examination of networked authoritarianism in Azerbaijan). At the same time, it has been waging a slow, covert campaign to dismantle the transatlantic alliance using "information weapons" honed in its near-abroad, most famously in Ukraine but also in Moldova.…”
Section: Analysis: Understanding Russia's Networked Authoritarianismmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Las prácticas de control más evidentes son los apagones de internet, el filtrado de contenidos por palabras clave y el bloqueo de URLs por DNS. A partir de 2009 empiezan a generalizarse controles de segunda generación como: restricción temporal de la conectividad en regiones en donde se producen protestas, bloqueo just-on-time de aplicaciones móvi-les, requerimientos informales de remoción de contenidos a los ISPs y a los administradores de sitios web, ralentización de las conexiones en momentos de alta conflictividad política y establecimiento de altos costos de los servicios para limitar el acceso masivo a internet (Deibert & Rohozinski, 2010;Pearce & Kendzior, 2012;Crete-Nishihata, Deibert & Senft, 2013;Puyosa, 2015).…”
Section: Control Político De Internetunclassified
“…Las prácticas más evidentes han sido de filtrado de palabras clave y bloqueo de contenidos, mas a partir de 2009 empiezan a usarse los controles de segunda-generación: corte total de acceso a internet en regiones en donde se producen protestas, bloqueo just-on-time de páginas web o aplicaciones móviles, requerimiento informales de remoción de contenidos a ISPs y a administradores de sitios web, ralentización de las conexiones a internet en momentos de alta conflictividad polí -tica y establecimiento de altos costos de los servicios para asegurar las limitaciones al acceso (Deibert & Rohozinski, 2010;Howard, Agarwal & Hussain, 2011;Pearce & Kendzior, 2012; Crete-Nishihata, Deibert & Senft, 2013;Murdoch & Roberts, 2013).…”
Section: El Dilema Del Dictador Digital Y El Tablero De Juego De Veneunclassified