On the Number and Size of Nations

Alesina, Alberto; Spolaore, Enrico

doi:10.1162/003355300555411

Cited by 1,074 publications

(368 citation statements)

References 15 publications

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“…More recently, a few scholars, mostly employing the tools of microeconomics, have developed several analytical models to predict the size of countries as a consequence of both the degree of trade integration and the preferences of citizens over the level of redistribution and public good provision (Alesina 2002, Alesina and Spolaore 1997, Bolton and Roland 1997. 3 Although both the economic and sociological approaches provide invaluable insights on the formation of countries, they are ultimately limited by their respective methodological and substantive choices.…”

Section: Current Research On Number and Size Of Statesmentioning

confidence: 99%

War, Wealth and the Formation of States

Boix

Codenotti

Resta

2011

Political Economy of Institutions, Democracy and Voting

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Section: Current Research On Number and Size Of Statesmentioning

confidence: 99%

War, Wealth and the Formation of States

Boix

Codenotti

Resta

2011

Political Economy of Institutions, Democracy and Voting

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“…Military power has historically been a central tool to ensure a government's monopoly of legitimate use of coercion over a territory. Integration of defense and security under one authority usually goes hand in hand with the centralization of this monopoly of coercion -that is, with the formation of a sovereign state or federation (Alesina and Spolaore 2003). However, different populations with different histories, cultures and identities are likely to disagree over the type of government in charge of such a federation.…”

Section: The Political Economy Of Heterogeneous Populationsmentioning

confidence: 99%

What is European Integration Really About? A Political Guide for Economists

Spolaore¹

2013

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Europe's monetary union is part of a broader process of integration that started in the aftermath of World War II. In this "political guide for economists" we look at the creation of the euro within the bigger picture of European integration. How and why were European institutions established? What are the goals and determinants of European Integration? What is European integration really about? We address these questions from a political-economy perspective, building on ideas and results from the economic literature on the formation of states and political unions. Specifically, we look at the motivations, assumptions, and limitations of the European strategy, initiated by Jean Monnet and his collaborators, of partially integrating policy functions in a few areas, with the expectation that more integration will follow in other areas, in a sort of chain reaction towards an "ever-closer union." The euro with its current problems is a child of that strategy and its limits.

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“…According to theory, if regional integration increases, (political) costs of coordination rise due to more heterogeneity in preferences. Regions whose preferences are not considered adequately by the central decision-making may have the incentive to leave (Alesina and Spolaore 2003). Applied to the EU, withdrawal of a member state could become an option when the advantages of EU-membership are dominated by the advantages of being a non EU-member.…”

Section: The Relevance Of the Exit Optionmentioning

confidence: 99%

The right of withdrawal in the treaty of Lisbon: a game theoretic reflection on different decision processes in the EU

Lechner

Ohr

2010

Eur J Law Econ

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The ways of decision-making within the EU have significantly changed in the last decades: The rule of unanimity has been more and more substituted by majority voting in order to speed up decision-making processes in a Union of 27 heterogeneous member states. A third possibility is now offered by the Lisbon Treaty including a constitutional right of withdrawal. A member state encountering a loss in its benefits caused by a decision made by majority voting may now demand compensating transfers by using the right of withdrawal. It might threaten to leave the EU if the compensation is denied. Hence, does this mean that member states now have regained a negotiation power comparable to the right to veto? Using a game theoretic approach we investigate the amount of compensating transfers to be offered under majority decisions with exit option compared to decisions requiring unanimity.

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On the Number and Size of Nations

Cited by 1,074 publications

References 15 publications

War, Wealth and the Formation of States

War, Wealth and the Formation of States

What is European Integration Really About? A Political Guide for Economists

The right of withdrawal in the treaty of Lisbon: a game theoretic reflection on different decision processes in the EU

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