Pareto Efficient Auctions with Interest Rates

Goel, Gagan; Mirrokni, Vahab; Leme, Renato Paes

doi:10.1609/aaai.v33i01.33011989

Cited by 4 publications

(2 citation statements)

References 15 publications

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Order By: Relevance

“…In addition to the above, there are other related work studying slightly different bidding models, e.g. Babaioff et al (2021); Goel et al (2019Goel et al ( , 2014; Golrezaei et al (2021) study utility maximizers with ROI constraints, and Fadaei and Bichler (2016); Wilkens et al (2017Wilkens et al ( , 2016 study value maximizing bidders with per-auction target constraints.…”

Section: Related Workmentioning

confidence: 99%

Towards Efficient Auctions in an Auto-bidding World

Deng

Mao

Mirrokni

et al. 2021

Proceedings of the Web Conference 2021

Self Cite

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

We study autobidding ad auctions with user costs, where each bidder is value-maximizing subject to a return-over-investment (ROI) constraint, and the seller aims to maximize the social welfare taking into consideration the user's cost of viewing an ad. We show that in the worst case, the approximation ratio of social welfare by running the vanilla VCG auctions with user costs could as bad as 0. To improve the performance of VCG, We propose a new variant of VCG based on properly chosen cost multipliers, and prove that there exist auctiondependent and bidder-dependent cost multipliers that guarantee approximation ratios of 1/2 and 1/4 respectively in terms of the social welfare.

show abstract

Section: Related Workmentioning

confidence: 99%

Towards Efficient Auctions in an Auto-bidding World

Deng

Mao

Mirrokni

et al. 2021

Proceedings of the Web Conference 2021

Self Cite

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…Golrezaei et al [2021c] study the auction design for utility-maximizers with ROI constraints, where the behavior model is equivalent to the special case of ours with 𝜆 = 1/(1 + minimal ROI). Besides the model of constrained optimization, there is another generalization of the utility models with ROI constraints adopted by Babaio et al [2021], Goel et al [2014Goel et al [ , 2019. In particular, the negative payment term in the utility function is replaced by a general cost, which is often a convex function of the payment.…”

Section: Related Workmentioning

confidence: 99%

Robust Auction Design in the Auto-bidding World

Balseiro¹,

Deng²,

Mao³

et al. 2021

Preprint

Self Cite

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

In classic auction theory, reserve prices are known to be e ective for improving revenue for the auctioneer against quasi-linear utility maximizing bidders. The introduction of reserve prices, however, usually do not help improve total welfare of the auctioneer and the bidders. In this paper, we focus on value maximizing bidders with return on spend constraints-a paradigm that has drawn considerable attention recently as more advertisers adopt auto-bidding algorithms in advertising platforms-and show that the introduction of reserve prices has a novel impact on the market. Namely, by choosing reserve prices appropriately the auctioneer can improve not only the total revenue but also the total welfare. Our results also demonstrate that reserve prices are robust to bidder types, i.e., reserve prices work well for di erent bidder types, such as value maximizers and utility maximizers, without using bidder type information. We generalize these results for a variety of auction mechanisms such as VCG, GSP, and rst-price auctions. Moreover, we show how to combine these results with additive boosts to improve the welfare of the outcomes of the auction further. Finally, we complement our theoretical observations with an empirical study con rming the e ectiveness of these ideas using data from online advertising auctions.

show abstract

Non-Clairvoyant Dynamic Mechanism Design with Budget Constraints and Beyond

Deng

Mirrokni

Zuo

2021

Proceedings of the 22nd ACM Conference on Economics and Computation

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

We provide a general design framework for dynamic mechanisms under complex environments, coined Lossless History Compression mechanisms. Lossless history compression mechanisms compress the history into a state carrying the least historical information without losing any generality in terms of either revenue or welfare. In particular, the characterization works for almost arbitrary constraints on the outcomes, and any objective function defined on the historical reports, allocations, and the cumulative payments. We then apply our framework to design a non-clairvoyant dynamic mechanism under budget and ex-post individual rationality constraints that is dynamic incentive-compatible and achieves non-trivial revenue performance, even without any knowledge about the future. In particular, our dynamic mechanism obtains a constant approximation to the optimal dynamic mechanism having access to all information in advance. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first dynamic mechanism that achieves a constant approximation and strictly respects dynamic incentive-compatibility and budget constraints without relying on any forecasts of the future. SSRN link: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3383231 CCS Concepts: • Theory of computation → Algorithmic game theory and mechanism design; Computational pricing and auctions; • Applied computing → Economics.

show abstract

Pareto Efficient Auctions with Interest Rates

Cited by 4 publications

References 15 publications

Towards Efficient Auctions in an Auto-bidding World

Towards Efficient Auctions in an Auto-bidding World

Robust Auction Design in the Auto-bidding World

Non-Clairvoyant Dynamic Mechanism Design with Budget Constraints and Beyond

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About