Polity age and political budget cycles: Evidence from a Danish municipal reform

Abstract

Incumbent incentive for competence-signaling and lack of voter information are generally thought to be factors that increase the prevalence of political budget cycles. These mechanisms should be more prevalent in new political units. Since the creation of new political units is rarely exogenous, however, serious endogeneity issues would be an issue for empirical studies of this subject. To overcome these problems, I use a Danish local government reform-which amalgamated some (but not all) Danish municipalities, thereby creating new political units-in a way that is arguably quasiexperimental to study whether political budget cycles are larger in new political units. Contrary to theoretical predictions, political budget cycles seem to be of a smaller scale in the new municipalities, but only regarding budget cycles in budgetary overruns. The findings are of wider interest for discussions the mechanisms behind context-conditional political budget cycles.

A Influência Dos Ciclos Político-Orçamentários E Das Ideologias Partidárias Na Despesa Com Pessoal Dos Estados Brasileiros

“…Como ramificação dos ciclos políticos, discorre-se os ciclos políticoorçamentários, teoria de interesse de estudos de diversas pesquisas e que tem ganhado contribuições de longa data (Aaskoven, 2018;Bonfatti & Forni, 2019;Bostashvili & Ujhelyi, 2019). Rogoff (1990), autor seminal da teoria dos ciclos político-orçamentários, comenta que o surgimento do ciclo se dá em virtude da necessidade de sinalização de competências ou preferências do governante ao eleitor antes das eleições, ou seja, utiliza da composição do orçamento fiscal como ferramenta de sinalização (Garcia & Hayo, 2021).…”

“…Relacionando com a teoria dos ciclos político-orçamentários, considera-se geralmente que os incentivos existentes para sinalização de competência e a falta de informação dos eleitores são fatores que aumentam a prevalência dos ciclos orçamentários políticos (Aaskoven, 2018). Assim, a presença de regras fiscais seria um fator inibidor da presença da manipulação realizada por políticos (Bonfatti &Forni, 2019).…”

The effect of female representation on political budget cycle and public expenditure: Evidence from Italian municipalities

“…http://orcid.org/0000-0002-0620-4149 Pasquale Giacobbe http://orcid.org/0000-0002-9308-1203 ENDNOTES 1 Empirical evidence of PBC has reported in several studies. Among others see Bonfatti and Forni (2019), Repetto (2018) and Cioffi et al (2012) for Italy; Sakurai and Menezes-Filho (2011) for Brazil; Drazen and Eslava (2010) for Colombia; Aaskoven (2018) for Denmark; Chortareas et al (2016) for Greece; Baskaran et al (2016) for Israel; Veiga and Veiga (2007) for Portugal and Akhmedov and Zhuravskaya (2004) for Russia.…”

Political Budget Cycle on The Regional Elections in Indonesia

“…The political budget cycle focuses on the regional elections cycle in government expenditures, taxes, and budgets deficit (Gootjes, Haan, & Jong-A-Pin, 2019). In some countries, political budget cycle practice has been proven, for example in the European Union (Efthyvoulou, 2012), London (Aidt & Mooney, 2014), Israel (Baskaran, Brender, Blesse, & Reingewertz, 2016), Italy (Alesina & Paradisi, 2017;Repetto, 2018), Denmark (Aaskoven, 2018), China (Guo, 2009;Tsai, 2016;Vortherms, 2019), Polandia (Turyna, Kula, Balmas, & Waclawska, 2016).…”