Polyhedral clinching auctions and the adwords polytope

Goel, Gagan; Mirrokni, Vahab; Leme, Renato Paes

doi:10.1145/2213977.2213990

Cited by 52 publications

(97 citation statements)

References 23 publications

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“…If bidders have private budgets, then they show that there is no efficient auction. Lavi and May () and Goel et al () follow Dobzinski et al's () results and study efficient auction design with public budgets. These two papers relax Dobzinski, Lavi, and Nisan's constant marginal values assumption and both give impossibility results.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 83%

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Efficient multiunit auctions for normal goods

Baisa

2020

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I study multiunit auction design when bidders have private values, multiunit demands, and non‐quasilinear preferences. Without quasilinearity, the Vickrey auction loses its desired incentive and efficiency properties. I give conditions under which we can design a mechanism that retains the Vickrey auction's desirable incentive and efficiency properties: (1) individual rationality, (2) dominant strategy incentive compatibility, and (3) Pareto efficiency. I show that there is a mechanism that retains the desired properties of the Vickrey auction if there are two bidders who have single‐dimensional types. I also present an impossibility theorem that shows that there is no mechanism that satisfies Vickrey's desired properties and weak budget balance when bidders have multidimensional types.

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Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 83%

“… See the discussion of Dobzinski et al (), Lavi and May (), and Goel et al () in the related literature section. Relatedly, Kazumura and Serizawa's () impossibility theorem requires that only one bidder has multiitem demand, but their type space is again rich relative to the type space studied here. …”

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confidence: 99%

Efficient multiunit auctions for normal goods

Baisa

2020

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“…In (Dobzinski, Lavi, and Nisan 2008) the authors design an incentive compatible, individually rational and Pareto-efficient auction for budget constrained utility functions. Their auction has been extended in multiple directions: (Bhattacharya et al 2010) show how to elicit budgets truthfully, (Fiat et al 2011;Colini-Baldeschi et al 2012) generalize the clinching to matching markets and (Goel, Mirrokni, and Paes Leme 2012) to general polymatroidal environments and (Goel, Mirrokni, and Paes Leme 2013) shows that the clinching auction allows for an online implementation. Closely related to this work is (Goel, Mirrokni, and Leme 2014) which designs Pareto-efficient auctions where agents have constrained quasi-linear utilities, which mean that a certain admissible set A i and −∞ otherwise.…”

Section: Related Workmentioning

confidence: 99%

Pareto Efficient Auctions with Interest Rates

Goel

Mirrokni

Leme

2019

AAAI

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We consider auction settings in which agents have limited access to monetary resources but are able to make payments larger than their available resources by taking loans with a certain interest rate. This setting is a strict generalization of budget constrained utility functions (which corresponds to infinite interest rates). Our main result is an incentive compatible and Pareto-efficient auction for a divisible multi-unit setting with 2 players who are able to borrow money with the same interest rate. The auction is an ascending price clock auction that bears some similarities to the clinching auction but at the same time is a considerable departure from this framework: allocated goods can be de-allocated in future and given to other agents and prices for previously allocated goods can be raised.

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“…The design of expressive auctions for specific applications is an important topic of contemporary mechanism design [e.g., Aggarwal et al 2009;Ghosh and Sayedi 2010;Constantin et al 2011;Dütting et al 2011b;Dobzinski et al 2012;Dütting et al 2012;Goel et al 2012]. The intuition that expressiveness is generally desirable is supported by work of Benisch et al [2008], who showed that the maximum social welfare a mechanism can achieve strictly increases with a measure of expressiveness based on a concept from computational learning theory.…”

Section: Related Workmentioning

confidence: 99%

Expressiveness and robustness of first-price position auctions

Dütting

Fischer

Parkes

2014

Proceedings of the Fifteenth ACM Conference on Economics and Computation

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It is desirable for an economic mechanism that its properties hold in a robust way across multiple equilibria and under varying assumptions regarding the information available to the participants. In this paper we focus on the design of position auctions and seek mechanisms that guarantee high revenue in every efficient equilibrium under both complete and incomplete information. Our main result identifies a generalized first-price auction with multi-dimensional bids as the only standard design capable of achieving this goal, even though valuations are one-dimensional. The fact that expressiveness beyond the valuation space is necessary for robustness provides an interesting counterpoint to previous work, which has highlighted the benefits of simple bid spaces. From a technical perspective, our results are interesting because they establish equilibrium existence for a multi-dimensional bid space, where standard techniques for establishing equilibrium existence break down.

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Polyhedral clinching auctions and the adwords polytope

Cited by 52 publications

References 23 publications

Efficient multiunit auctions for normal goods

Efficient multiunit auctions for normal goods

Pareto Efficient Auctions with Interest Rates

Expressiveness and robustness of first-price position auctions

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