Position error signal generation in hard disk drives based on a field programmable gate array (FPGA)

Xiong, Shanxin; Bogy, David B.

doi:10.1007/s00542-013-1786-z

Cited by 6 publications

(2 citation statements)

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“…The magnetic signal extracted from the servo sectors on the track is used as the feedback signal for position control servomechanism. A unique servo technology named Position Error Signal (PES) is designed for hard disk drive, 6,7 and another named Timed-Based Servo (TBS) is developed specifically for linear tape drives. 8,9 Following the magnetic coding in HDD, the ring's magnetic pattern is designed as shown in FIGURE 1(a) which consists of a sector ID and two rows of A and B burst patterns with overlapping zone for measurement synchronization.…”

Section: Operating Principlementioning

confidence: 99%

Dynamic analysis method of rotating shaft with magnetic pattern

2017

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Section: Operating Principlementioning

confidence: 99%

Dynamic analysis method of rotating shaft with magnetic pattern

2017

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“…Extracting speech from the PES, however, is complicated due to a weak signal-to-noise-ratio (SNR). Imperfections in the eccentricity of the platters, thermal drift, and turbulence from the rapid rotation of the disks all contribute to a large quantity of noise in the signal [4]. Through a mixture of digital filtering techniques in both the time domain and the frequency domain, however, we have managed to sufficiently clean the signal such that human speech can be completely reconstructed under certain conditions.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Hard Drive of Hearing: Disks that Eavesdrop with a Synthesized Microphone

Kwong

2019

2019 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (SP)

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Security conscious individuals may take considerable measures to disable sensors in order to protect their privacy. However, they often overlook the cyberphysical attack surface exposed by devices that were never designed to be sensors in the first place. Our research demonstrates that the mechanical components in magnetic hard disk drives behave as microphones with sufficient precision to extract and parse human speech. These unintentional microphones sense speech with high enough fidelity for the Shazam service to recognize a song recorded through the hard drive. This proof of concept attack sheds light on the possibility of invasion of privacy even in absence of traditional sensors. We also present defense mechanisms, such as the use of ultrasonic aliasing, that can mitigate acoustic eavesdropping by synthesized microphones in hard disk drives.

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