Quantitative Restrictions in the Presence of Cost-Based Informational Asymmetries

Herander, Mark G.; Kamp, Brad

doi:10.2307/1061281

Cited by 4 publications

(3 citation statements)

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“…Qiu (1994) and Brainard and Martimort (1997) investigate strategic trade policy with incomplete information about the domestic Cournot firm's costs. Herander and Kamp (1999) consider how incomplete information about the domestic cost structure can affect the outcomes of quantitative restrictions. While Collie and Hviid (1994), Herander and Kamp (1999) and Qiu (1994) use a signaling game framework, Brainard and Martimort (1997) develop their approach within an incentive contracts context.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Injury-Based Protection with Auditing under Imperfect Information

Kohler

Moore

2001

Southern Economic Journal

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We analyze optimal protection when a benevolent government must maintain nonnegative domestic profits and when the domestic import-competing firm has private information about its costs. A costly audit mechanism can deter strategic manipulation of this private information. We show that a high-penalty/lowprobability of investigation is optimal when the shadow price of the firm profit is low compared with the audit cost. A low-penalty/high-probability of investigation is optimal when there is a low investigation cost and a high shadow price of firm profit. In this latter case, the trade authority obtains truthful announcements by directly auditing the firm.

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Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Injury-Based Protection with Auditing under Imperfect Information

Kohler

Moore

2001

Southern Economic Journal

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“…Qiu (1994) and Brainard and Martimort (1997) investigate strategic trade policy with incomplete information about the domestic Cournot firm's costs. Herander and Kamp (1999) consider how incomplete information about the domestic cost structure can affect the outcomes of quantitative restrictions. While Collie and Hviid (1994), Herander and Kamp (1999), and Qiu (1994) use a signaling game framework, Brainard and Martimort (1997) develop their approach within an incentive contracts context.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Herander and Kamp (1999) consider how incomplete information about the domestic cost structure can affect the outcomes of quantitative restrictions. While Collie and Hviid (1994), Herander and Kamp (1999), and Qiu (1994) use a signaling game framework, Brainard and Martimort (1997) develop their approach within an incentive contracts context. This article's approach is based on both incentives and signals.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Injury‐Based Protection with Auditing under Imperfect Information

Kohler

Moore

2001

Southern Economic Journal

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We analyze optimal protection when a benevolent government must maintain nonnegative domestic profits and when the domestic import‐competing firm has private information about its costs. A costly audit mechanism can deter strategic manipulation of this private information. We show that a high penalty/low probability of investigation is optimal when the shadow price of the firm profit is low compared with the audit cost. A low penalty/high probability of investigation is optimal when there is a low investigation cost and a high shadow price of firm profit. In this latter case, the trade authority obtains truthful announcements by directly auditing the firm.

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Sensitivity of Tariffs and Quotas: A Signaling Game

Amin

2003

SSRN Journal

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Quantitative Restrictions in the Presence of Cost-Based Informational Asymmetries

Cited by 4 publications

References 0 publications

Injury-Based Protection with Auditing under Imperfect Information

Injury-Based Protection with Auditing under Imperfect Information

Injury‐Based Protection with Auditing under Imperfect Information

Sensitivity of Tariffs and Quotas: A Signaling Game

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