Rationality, Reasonableness, and Critical Rationalism: Problems with the Pragma-dialectical View

Siegel, Harvey; Biro, John

doi:10.1007/s10503-007-9063-x

Cited by 29 publications

(15 citation statements)

References 4 publications

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“…In the last two decades, epistemically oriented philosophers have voiced their criticisms of dialectically oriented argumentation theories at regular intervals. Among the most persistent are Biro and Siegel (Biro & Siegel: 1992;2006b;Siegel & Biro: 2008). In this paper we shall give a reply from a pragma-dialectical perspective and show that the objections by Biro and Siegel against the dialectical project are based on incorrect assumptions.…”

Section: Introduction: the Epistemic Challengementioning

confidence: 88%

A pragma-dialectical response to objectivist epistemic challenges

Garssen

Laar

2010

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Biro and Siegel have raised two objections against the pragmadialectical approach to argumentation. According to the first, the pragmadialectical theory is not genuinely normative. According to the second, the rejection of justificationism by pragma-dialecticians is unwarranted: they reject justificationism unjustly and they are not consistent in accepting some arguments ('justifications') as sound. The first objection is based on what we regard as the misconception that the goal of resolving differences of opinion cannot provide a normative perspective. In response to the second objection we argue that in pragma-dialectics, the notion of argument, and related notions, are defined in a non-justificatory manner.Resumé: Biro et Siegel ont soulevé des objections contre l'approche pragma-dialectique de l'évaluation de l'argumentation. Selon la première objection, la théorie pragmadialectique n'est pas authentiquement normative. Selon la seconde, le rejet du justificationisme par les pragmadialecticiens est injustifié: ils rejettent à tort le justificationisme et ils sont incohérents lorsqu'ils acceptent certains arguments («justifications») comme étant probants. La première objection est fondée sur l'idée fausse que le but de résoudre des différences d'opinion ne peut pas fournir une perspective normative. En réponse à la seconde objection, nous avançons que dans la pragma-dialectique, la notion d'argument ainsi que d'autres notions reliées se définissent de façon nonjustificative.Pragma-Dialectical Response to Objectivist Challenges 123

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Section: Introduction: the Epistemic Challengementioning

confidence: 88%

A pragma-dialectical response to objectivist epistemic challenges

Garssen

Laar

2010

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“…This position favors the critical bias mentioned before. Such deep-seated philosophical inclinations have a clear bearing on theorizing dialectic today (see discussions between Biro & Siegel 2008;Botting 2010;Garssen & van Laar 2010;Lumer 2012) and in the past, at least ever since the Socratic-Platonic notion of dialectical method merged the maieutic element of discovering truth with the critical elenchus (e.g., Spranzi 2011).…”

Section: Charity and Dialecticmentioning

confidence: 99%

The Paradox of Charity

Lewiński

2012

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The principle of charity is used in philosophy of language and argumentation theory as an important principle of interpretation which credits speakers with “the best” plausible interpretation of their discourse. I contend that the argumentation account, while broadly advocated, misses the basic point of a dialectical conception which approaches argumentation as discussion between (at least) two parties who disagree over the issue discussed. Therefore, paradoxically, an analyst who is charitable to one discussion party easily becomes uncharitable to the other. To overcome this paradox, I suggest to significantly limit the application of the principle of charity depending on contextual factors.

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“…In recent times defenders of the epistemological approach to argumentation ("epistemologists" for short) have fundamentally criticised pragma-dialectics in several respects (Siegel & Biro 1997;Siegel & Biro 2008;Lumer 2010). In particular, while recognising that pragma-dialectics defends some epistemic reasonableness and has some epistemically conducive elements, they criticise that the basic setting of pragma-dialectical discussions is consensualistic, i.e., organised in such a way as to achieve an epistemically unqualified consensus on the basis of premises and inference rules freely (without epistemological constraints) stipulated in the discussion's opening stage, which must lead to epistemically inferior results: too many false and unjustified beliefs.…”

Section: Background and Aim Of This Replymentioning

confidence: 99%

The Epistemic Inferiority of Pragma-Dialectics – Reply to Botting

Lumer

2012

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Abstract:In a recent paper in this journal, David Botting defended pragma-dialectics against epistemological criticisms by exponents of the epistemological approach to argumentation, i.e., Harvey Siegel, John Biro and me. In particular, Botting tries to justify with new arguments a Functional Claim, that the function of argumentation is to resolve disputes, and a Normative Claim, that standpoints that have the unqualified consensus of all participants in a dispute will generally be epistemically sound. In this reply it is shown that Botting's arguments are fallacious, that the two Claims are false and that the epistemological approach to argumentation, of course, outclasses pragma-dialectics epistemically and is at least as good as it in other respects. Résumé:Dans un récent article paru dans cette revue, David Botting a défendu la pragma-dialectique contre les critiques épistémologiques avancées par des représentants de l'approche épistémologique de l'argumentation, à savoir Harvey Siegel, John Biro et moi. En particulier, Botting tente de justifier avec des arguments nouveaux une position fonctionnelle selon laquelle le rôle de l'argumentation consiste à ré-soudre des différends, et une position normative selon laquelle des points de vue qui reçoivent un consensus non qualifié de tous les participants à un différend sont généra-lement épistémiquement solides. Je montre que les arguments de Botting sont fallacieux, que les deux positions sont fausses et que l'approche épistémologique de l'argumentation surclasse épistémiquement la pragma-dialectique et est au moins aussi bonne à d'autres égards.

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Rationality, Reasonableness, and Critical Rationalism: Problems with the Pragma-dialectical View

Cited by 29 publications

References 4 publications

A pragma-dialectical response to objectivist epistemic challenges

A pragma-dialectical response to objectivist epistemic challenges

The Paradox of Charity

The Epistemic Inferiority of Pragma-Dialectics – Reply to Botting

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