Reconciling Perspectives on Blame Avoidance Behaviour

Abstract

Blame avoidance behaviour (BAB) has become an increasingly popular topic in political science. However, the preconditions of BAB, its presence and consequences in various areas and in different political systems largely remain a black box. In order to generate a better understanding of BAB and its importance for the workings of democratic political systems, the scattered literature on BAB needs to be assessed and structured. This article offers a comprehensive review of the literature on blame avoidance. It departs from Weaver's concept of blame avoidance and subsequently differentiates between work on BAB in comparative welfare state research and work on BAB in public policy and administration. It is argued that between these two strands of literature a bifurcation exists since both perspectives rarely draw on each other to create a more general understanding of BAB. Advantages from existing approaches must be combined to assess the phenomenon of blame avoidance in a more comprehensive way.Keywords: blame avoidance behaviour; elite behaviour; political strategy; literature review Current public affairs are increasingly characterised by rising public expectations and by the media-induced politicisation and scandalisation of events (Flinders, 2014;Strömbäck, 2008). It is not surprising that these developments have an impact on the behaviour of actors at the centre of public affairs and media interest. This explains why the phenomenon of blame avoidance behaviour (BAB) has become an increasingly popular topic in political science. BAB displayed by public actors encompasses all kinds of activities intended to downplay or distance oneself from (potentially) blameattracting and goal-threatening events. The study of this type of elite behaviour has experienced renewed interest in recent years, which is not least demonstrated by the growing number of articles published in various subfields of the discipline that consider aspects of blame avoidance. Although scholars generally agree that BAB is an important aspect of democratic governance that needs to be taken into account when the workings of democratic political systems are examined, the preconditions of BAB, its presence and consequences in various areas and in different political systems largely remain a black box (Hinterleitner and Sager, 2015). For instance, how does the political system handle blame? Is it still functional -can it cope with blame and fulfil its basic functions? Or does it lead to political polarisation, policy stalemate and public disaffection (Weaver, 2013)? These are only a few of the questions that need to be answered in order to gain a better understanding of BAB and its impact on the workings of democratic systems. However, differences in approaches towards BAB abound. A first step towards answering these questions is a comprehensive review of the literature. This article departs from Weaver's concept of blame avoidance and subsequently differentiates between work on

Blame‐shifting in Times of Permanent Austerity: Evidence from Spain and Greece in the Eurozone Crisis

“…There are different strands and several classifications of blame avoidance strategies (Hinterleitner, ; Hood, ; Weaver, , p. 385). Anticipatory forms prepare for future blame‐attracting developments; they focus on the political process and target the organization and design of policies.…”

Anticipatory and reactive forms of blame avoidance: of foxes and lions

“…The causal chain linking the economic performance of politicians to voters' evaluation of that performance comprises four steps: (1) policies are enacted by politicians; (2) voters evaluate policies for their economic implications; (3) voters assign responsibility for the policies they evaluate; and (4) they vote accordingly. In this context, BAB is considered as a way to circumvent electoral punishment by influencing steps (2) and (3) (Hinterleitner, 2015). Scholars have examined the use of blame avoidance strategies for retrenchment purposes in various settings and have explored the conditions under which officeholders can successfully apply such strategies (Vis, 2009;Giger and Nelson, 2011;Wenzelburger, 2011;Mortensen, 2012;Jensen and Mortensen, 2014;Wenzelburger, 2014;Vis, 2016;Hinterleitner et al, 2016;Sager and Hinterleitner, 2016).…”

Accountability and Blame Avoidance After Crises

“…To avoid risk and blame, actors can choose between different basic strategies, including presentational, agency, and policy strategies (Hood, 2002). The latter two are anticipatory strategies that actors design into their system of responsibility (limiting formal responsibility for policy substance, the policy strategy) and accountability (shifting responsibility for policy implementation to others, the agency strategy) (Hinterleitner, 2017). The presentational strategy is a post-hoc and rhetorical one.…”

“…Blame avoidance studies, departing from Kent Weaver's seminal work in 1986, abound in comparative welfare state research, on the one hand (focusing on ex ante arrangements to avoid blame for unpopular policy decisions, cf. Green-Pedersen, 2002;Pierson, 1994;Vis, 2016), and on public policy and administration research, on the other (Hinterleitner, 2017). The latter branch of research includes many studies pertaining to a range, from human-made political crises and policy failures to natural and industrial disasters (e.g., Boin, 't Hart, & McConnell, 2009;Brändström & Kuipers, 2003;Hinterleitner & Sager, 2015;Hood, 2002;Hood et al, 2009).…”