2012
DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6210.2012.02653.x
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Responsiveness to Reform Values: The Influence of the Environment on Performance Information Use

Abstract: Administrative reforms encode a set of behavioral expectations for bureaucrats to follow. The authors argue that scholars can usefully contribute to understanding accountability by studying whether bureaucrats follow these expectations and what factors encourage such responsiveness to reform values. To demonstrate this approach, the authors examine performance infor‐mation use as a behavioral measure of responsiveness to results‐based reforms. Using a sample of Texas school superintendents, they find that gene… Show more

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Cited by 79 publications
(70 citation statements)
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References 41 publications
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“…External stakeholders, including interest groups and citizen groups, are consumers of performance information in the political market. They are on the 'demand' side of the equation, and ask for governmental reform and performance management (Berman & Wang, 2000;Bourdeaux & Chikoto, 2008;Ho, 2006;Moynihan & Hawes, 2012;Moynihan & Ingraham, 2004;Moynihan & Pandey, 2010;Yang & Hsieh, 2007 Competing interest groups may rely on different sources of performance information that benefit their own agenda (Knight, 1992). Although most interest groups would prefer a transparent information system to monitor action implementation, self-interest drives some interest groups to withhold information and prioritize individual interests over collective interests (North, 1990).…”
Section: Theoretical Hypotheses Of the Difference Between External Anmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…External stakeholders, including interest groups and citizen groups, are consumers of performance information in the political market. They are on the 'demand' side of the equation, and ask for governmental reform and performance management (Berman & Wang, 2000;Bourdeaux & Chikoto, 2008;Ho, 2006;Moynihan & Hawes, 2012;Moynihan & Ingraham, 2004;Moynihan & Pandey, 2010;Yang & Hsieh, 2007 Competing interest groups may rely on different sources of performance information that benefit their own agenda (Knight, 1992). Although most interest groups would prefer a transparent information system to monitor action implementation, self-interest drives some interest groups to withhold information and prioritize individual interests over collective interests (North, 1990).…”
Section: Theoretical Hypotheses Of the Difference Between External Anmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…In the New Public Administration context, the work of Moynihan and Hawes (2012) examines the use of performance information as a behavioral measure in administrative reforms. These authors assume that if performance information is used, then decision-making processes are better.…”
Section: Discussionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…In the last few decades, the government has given greater importance to management using statistical data as a fundamental tool in its reforms (Moynihan & Hawes, 2012). For Brazilian judiciary organizations in particular, the adoption of indicators has often been encouraged by the National Justice Council (Conselho Nacional de Justiça [CNJ]) in the context of its audit reports, which seek to compile data on expenditures, investments, amount of human capital, and information related to judicial processes (CNJ, 2016).…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…The theoretical framework presented in this article posits that governance complexity is part of the macro-environmental challenge, which all public organisations must face (Klijn and Koppenjan 2016;Moynihan and Hawes 2012). However, for different policy areas, such as transparency policy, complexity will challenge organisations in different ways.…”
Section: Theoretical Framework and Hypothesesmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Governance networks elude centralised control, and there are coordination costs, competing interests, and information management challenges that contribute to their complexity (Hajer and Wagenaar 2003;Rhodes 1996). If complexity is not well-managed, poor performance can result from a variety of problems such as misallocation of resources, conflicting goals, or miscommunication (Klijn and Koppenjan 2016;Moynihan and Hawes 2012;Verweij et al 2013).…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%