Strategic deterrence: The key competences of the state bodies of the Republic of Serbia
Abstract: In the post-Cold War period, contemporary studies of strategic deterrence have expanded from traditional ones to contents that are much broader in terms of content and topics. It can be said that today this is the comprehensive activity that should engage the entire society, proclaiming the concept of the whole power. Providing the systematic implementation of the principle of comprehensiveness, together with the principle of knowledge-worthiness and timeliness, certainly represents a key prerequisite for effe… Show more
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Cited by 5 publications
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Germany's (lack of) success in implementing the American strategy of extended detterence against Russia
Examining the relationship between Germany and the U.S. through Lake's theory of international hierarchies reveals that, in the area of security, this relationship is at the very end of the hierarchy, with Germany in a subordinate position. The foundation of this relationship is a "trade-off": security for sovereignty, meaning that Germany entrusts its security to the U.S., but in return, it is obligated to align its security policy with American policy, thereby losing part of its sovereignty. With the onset of the Russo-Ukrainian war in 2022, the U.S. opted for a strategy of extended deterrence against Russia, and Germany, as dictated by this hierarchical relationship, aligned its defence policy with the U.S. and accepted its role in the American strategy of extended deterrence. Although Germany has played a significant role in U.S. extended deterrence against Russia since the beginning of the Russo-Ukrainian war, the question arises whether this strategy is successful in the case of Germany. For a strategy to be considered successful, it must be both efficient and effective. The main hypothesis is that as time passes and the war progresses, Germany's implementation of the strategy of extended deterrence reveals itself to be both ineffective and inefficient. To answer the central research question, the paper is divided into three chapters. The first analyses the relationship between Germany and the U.S. through Lake's theory of international hierarchies, emphasizing what this relationship means for Germany. This relationship is at the very end of the hierarchy, effectively constituting a protectorate. Consequently, this relationship obliges Germany to implement the strategy of extended deterrence against Russia as part of the broader competition between the U.S. and Russia. The second part of the paper discusses why Germany believed in the effectiveness of the strategy of extended deterrence against Russia at the beginning of the Russo-Ukrainian war and how the U.S. contributed to this belief. A prerequisite for successful deterrence, and thus extended deterrence, is possessing adequate power so that the threat of its use is effective. Due to the pronounced asymmetry in military capabilities between Germany and Russia, an autonomous German implementation of the strategy of extended deterrence would not be possible because the threat would not be effective. Additionally, any state conducting a strategy of extended deterrence must include in its assessment the risk associated with an insufficient capability to deter a potential aggressor. Germany's military "sterility" makes the risk of implementing a strategy of extended deterrence unacceptable. However, the mentioned hierarchical relationship with the U.S., which is a nuclear power and the most militarily powerful country in the world, with a significant number of troops and armaments on German territory, enables Germany to implement this strategy. Thus, three days after the war began, German Chancellor Scholz implicitly indicated Germany's willingness to be part of the U.S. extended deterrence against Russia in his speech. Since then, activities have been conducted, conditionally speaking, at three levels: that of Germany, Europe, and the U.S. on German soil. Finally, the third chapter focuses on analyzing the effectiveness and efficiency of Germany's implementation of the strategy of extended deterrence. More than two years since the start of the war, a cost-benefit analysis indicates a negative relationship between investment and outcomes, meaning that for Germany, this strategy is ineffective. Germany's economy, no matter how strong, cannot quickly compensate for decades of underinvestment in the military and transform militarily "sterile" Germany into a military power. On the other hand, regarding effectiveness, the primary goal of implementing this strategy is stated as peace in Europe, and thus in Ukraine. However, the activities Germany undertakes lead to an arms race with Russia, and the stationing of German troops in Lithuania, along with the increase of military capacities in Kaliningrad, creates a security dilemma, which brings Germany a step closer to war rather than peace. This indicates that Germany's implementation of the strategy of extended deterrence is also ineffective. The inefficacy and ineffectiveness confirm Germany's failure to implement the American strategy of extended deterrence.
Germany's (lack of) success in implementing the American strategy of extended detterence against Russia
Examining the relationship between Germany and the U.S. through Lake's theory of international hierarchies reveals that, in the area of security, this relationship is at the very end of the hierarchy, with Germany in a subordinate position. The foundation of this relationship is a "trade-off": security for sovereignty, meaning that Germany entrusts its security to the U.S., but in return, it is obligated to align its security policy with American policy, thereby losing part of its sovereignty. With the onset of the Russo-Ukrainian war in 2022, the U.S. opted for a strategy of extended deterrence against Russia, and Germany, as dictated by this hierarchical relationship, aligned its defence policy with the U.S. and accepted its role in the American strategy of extended deterrence. Although Germany has played a significant role in U.S. extended deterrence against Russia since the beginning of the Russo-Ukrainian war, the question arises whether this strategy is successful in the case of Germany. For a strategy to be considered successful, it must be both efficient and effective. The main hypothesis is that as time passes and the war progresses, Germany's implementation of the strategy of extended deterrence reveals itself to be both ineffective and inefficient. To answer the central research question, the paper is divided into three chapters. The first analyses the relationship between Germany and the U.S. through Lake's theory of international hierarchies, emphasizing what this relationship means for Germany. This relationship is at the very end of the hierarchy, effectively constituting a protectorate. Consequently, this relationship obliges Germany to implement the strategy of extended deterrence against Russia as part of the broader competition between the U.S. and Russia. The second part of the paper discusses why Germany believed in the effectiveness of the strategy of extended deterrence against Russia at the beginning of the Russo-Ukrainian war and how the U.S. contributed to this belief. A prerequisite for successful deterrence, and thus extended deterrence, is possessing adequate power so that the threat of its use is effective. Due to the pronounced asymmetry in military capabilities between Germany and Russia, an autonomous German implementation of the strategy of extended deterrence would not be possible because the threat would not be effective. Additionally, any state conducting a strategy of extended deterrence must include in its assessment the risk associated with an insufficient capability to deter a potential aggressor. Germany's military "sterility" makes the risk of implementing a strategy of extended deterrence unacceptable. However, the mentioned hierarchical relationship with the U.S., which is a nuclear power and the most militarily powerful country in the world, with a significant number of troops and armaments on German territory, enables Germany to implement this strategy. Thus, three days after the war began, German Chancellor Scholz implicitly indicated Germany's willingness to be part of the U.S. extended deterrence against Russia in his speech. Since then, activities have been conducted, conditionally speaking, at three levels: that of Germany, Europe, and the U.S. on German soil. Finally, the third chapter focuses on analyzing the effectiveness and efficiency of Germany's implementation of the strategy of extended deterrence. More than two years since the start of the war, a cost-benefit analysis indicates a negative relationship between investment and outcomes, meaning that for Germany, this strategy is ineffective. Germany's economy, no matter how strong, cannot quickly compensate for decades of underinvestment in the military and transform militarily "sterile" Germany into a military power. On the other hand, regarding effectiveness, the primary goal of implementing this strategy is stated as peace in Europe, and thus in Ukraine. However, the activities Germany undertakes lead to an arms race with Russia, and the stationing of German troops in Lithuania, along with the increase of military capacities in Kaliningrad, creates a security dilemma, which brings Germany a step closer to war rather than peace. This indicates that Germany's implementation of the strategy of extended deterrence is also ineffective. The inefficacy and ineffectiveness confirm Germany's failure to implement the American strategy of extended deterrence.
The concept of total defense in the deterrence strategy of the Republic of Serbia
The subject of this article refers to the examination of the convenience of the concept of total defense as a basis for designing a defense system in the function of strategic deterrence of the Republic of Serbia. The existing defense system was supposed to be based on the concept of total defense, which has not been defined, verified and generally accepted since the Republic of Serbia was founded. In accordance with the above, the question arises: whether the existing way of organizing and functioning of the defense system corresponds to the requirements of strategic deterrence. The starting point in this paper is the position that the defense system, without a previously defined and generally accepted concept of total defense, may not be fully efficient and effective in creating a credible and persuasive threat in the function of strategic deterrence. The results of the research indicate that in order to develop the necessary defenece forces capabilities and their use for strategic deterrence, it is necessary to first develop the concept of total defense. Through the development process, it is possible to achieve full agreement of all forces on their tasks, methods of engagement and associated risks. Also, with the concept of total defense, it is possible to determine measures and recommendations on changes in the existing defense system that should increase the effectiveness and efficiency of strategic deterrence. The theoretical-methodological approach used a theoretical analysis and comparison of total defense concepts in different historical and geopolitical conditions, as well as a method concept development that can meet the requirements of strategic deterrence in the conditions of a modern multidimensional strategic environment.
The military service as part of the social ideal in Serbia
Compulsory conscription in Serbia was established in the 19th century, and the military as a social institution rapidly became an indispensable part of the socialization process of citizens. It remained so until 2011, which lent credibility to the strategic considerations of deterrence and total defense of that time. The return of war to European soil actualizes the issue of society's readiness for defense in many European countries. Serbian society has changed significantly in the two previous decades, becoming largely described by Bauman's fluid modernity, and the capacity of citizens for armed and unarmed resistance in the event of war has significantly declined. Starting from the assumption that the suspension of the compulsory conscription remains valid, the authors examine the possibilities for increasing the interest of young people in voluntary military service, which is the subject of this paper. The aim of the paper is to show the necessity, justification and content of state incentives for young people who opt for military service, as well as to point out their probable social consequences. The theoretical framework of the work is the theory of the network society of Manuel Castells and his understanding of individuation as a cultural tendency of modern society that differs from individualism. The authors conclude that increasing interest in voluntary military service is possible by connecting individual projects of citizens with military service as part of a common, social ideal in Serbia. State incentives for voluntary military service and, subsequently, participation in the active and passive reserves, could be divided into three groups. The first would be incentives related to employment, the second would be cooperation between the state and civic initiatives and organizations, and the third would be incentives related to business and tax incentives.
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